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This paper presents evidence on the impact of labor regulations on income 
inequality using two recently published databases on labor institutions and 
outcomes (Rama and Artecona, 2002; Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-
Silanes and Shleifer, 2003) and different cross-section and panel data analysis 
techniques for a sample of 121 countries over the 1970-2000 period. When we 
consider the techniques most likely to be robust, we find that: (i) de jure 
regulations do not improve income distribution; (ii) relative compliance with 
existing regulations improves income distribution; (iii) de facto regulations are 
weakly associated with improving income inequality. This result partly reflects 
the fact that regulations are endogenous and, more interestingly, different 
regulations have quite distinct effects. In particular, we find that any redistributive 
effect of labor regulations may come from trade union membership, public 
employment and mandated benefits (proxied by maternity leave).  
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
The fact that labor market regulations are at the cornerstone of the economic policy and political 
economy debate in many countries shows that changes in regulations can have non-trivial 
effects. Because there are protected and unprotected groups, changes in regulation have, at the 
very least, different consequences for particular groups.  From a more general perspective, 
however, labor regulations may also represent interesting tradeoffs, specifically regarding 
efficiency and equity. In this paper we empirically study one particular ingredient of this type of 
tradeoff, namely the effect of labor regulations on income distribution.  
For that purpose, we present evidence on the impact of labor regulations on income 
inequality using two recently published databases on labor institutions of de jure regulations and 
outcomes of de facto regulations. The first is Rama and Artecona (2002), subsequently referred 
to as RA, and Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003), subsequently 
referred to as BDLLS. We consider other country characteristics that may affect income 
distribution, including income level and growth, education and the structure of the economy. 
Furthermore, we use a battery of cross-section and panel data analysis techniques in order to 
evaluate the robustness of the results. In particular, we use cross-section, pooled, country fixed 
effects, and time fixed-effects panel data, with instrumental variables and GMM estimators. The 
sample we consider includes 121 countries over the 1970-2000 period, and we focus on two 
groups: the total sample and the sample of developing countries.   
This paper is closely related to Calderón and Chong (2004) and should, in certain 
dimensions, be taken as its complement. To begin with, it is based on the same datasets (except 
for inequality) and considers similar estimation techniques.  More interestingly, perhaps, both 
papers taken together precisely allow the reader to evaluate whether the tradeoff mentioned 
above exists and what its relative importance may be.    
The main findings are the following: 
 
(i)  There is evidence that de jure regulations (what labor codes prescribe) do not 
improve income inequality. In fact, with the RA database, we do not find 
robust results, although in a few cases, the effect shows that regulations 
worsen income distribution. When we consider the BDLLS dataset, we find 
  5that regulations on employment and industrial relations (though not on social 
security) have a negative effect on income distribution. 
 
(ii)  There is a positive effect of compliance with labor regulations, measured as 
the ratio between a de facto index and a de jure index, on income 
distribution. Considering that the result cannot be explained by summing up 
the individual effects of each index separately, it may capture institutional 
development rather than labor market considerations. 
 
(iii) De facto regulations are weakly associated with better income distribution. 
This result could be due to endogeneity of labor regulations. When 
controlling for this problem, many times the effect is not different from zero, 
although there are some cases in which the results show that these regulations 
improve income distribution.  
 
(iv)  Apart from the endogeneity problem, these mixed results are in part 
explained by the fact that once one considers specific de facto regulations, the 
results can differ markedly across regulations. In this regard, the most robust 
results are the following: 
 
-  Minimum wages, especially measured as a percentage of per capita 
income, worsen income inequality.  
-  Trade union membership (as percentage of labor force) has a positive 
effect on income distribution. Its effect on the poorest 20 percent is 
smaller and less robust than for the “middle class.” 
-  Government employment at the general level (less so at the central 
level) has a positive effect on income distribution. Its effect on the 
poorest quintile is nil.  
-  Days of maternity leave have a positive effect on income distribution.  
-  ILO Convention 87 ratification and social security contributions do not 
have a robust effect on income inequality across estimation methods 
and samples.  
 
  6The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on the 
impact of labor market regulations on income inequality. Section 3 reviews the data sets and the 
methodology we use. Section 4 presents the results of the different estimation techniques. 
Section 5 discusses the overall results and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In a seminal paper, Kuznets (1955) argues that the relationship between income inequality and 
the level of development follows an inverted U-shaped curve. Inequality rises in the face of 
economic expansion during the initial stages of development, and it declines afterwards. The 
relationship stipulated by Kuznets has been recently simulated successfully within a general 
equilibrium framework (Galor and Tsiddon, 1996).  In addition, recent evidence has shown that: 
(i) unemployment is one of the major sources of inequality (Jenkins, 1995, 1996), and (ii) labor 
market policies are a potential instrument to reduce inequality (Rama, 2001a).  
Saint-Paul (1999) claims that labor market institutions around the world usually consist 
of tax systems or other transfer mechanisms that divert resources from the working to the non-
working population. These institutions include unemployment benefits, employment protection 
laws, and active employment policies by the government, among others. It has been argued that 
these institutions are necessary to protect workers from bad outcomes and unexpected shocks 
(Blanchard, 2002). In general, labor market institutions are supposed to help achieve socially 
desirable redistributive goals (Emerson and Dramais, 1988; Rama, 2001a, 2003). In this context, 
labor market policies may be an effective tool for reducing income inequality. However, there is 
increasing debate on the benefits of labor policies such as minimum wages, mandated benefits, 
collective bargaining, job security or public sector employment in developing countries (Rama, 
2001a, 2003). 
Regarding the imposition of minimum wages, Saint-Paul (1994) argues that they may 
have an adverse effect on income distribution. Minimum wages redistribute income: (a) from 
skilled to unskilled labor, and (b) from the poorest to the lower-middle quintiles by generating 
unemployment.
1  Microeconomic studies suggest that the impact of minimum wages on income 
                                                 
1 Saint-Paul (1994) claims that minimum wages create unemployment among unskilled workers and reduces the 
income of skilled workers, thus reducing output. In addition, the impact of minimum wages on inequality is affected 
by other forms of labor rigidities. For example, income is shared equally among unskilled workers in a world with 
high job turnover, hence, minimum wages have a small impact on inequality among the unskilled. 
  7inequality is small in many developing countries (Maloney and Nuñez, 2001). On the other hand, 
Rama (2001b) analyzes the doubling of minimum wages (in real terms) in Indonesia in the early 
1990s. He finds that the elasticity of average to minimum wages was approximately 10 percent 
over this period, and that the doubling of minimum wages was associated with a slight decline in 
total wage employment and a substantial increase in unemployment among small enterprises. On 
the other hand, trade union membership seems to guarantee a higher wage for members. 
However, the union wage premium in developing countries is smaller than among industrial 
countries. This finding may be due to the role of trade unions in keeping wage rates invariant 
during periods of economic adjustment (Nelson, 1991).  
Rama (2001a) finds a small number of studies on the impact of public sector employment 
on income inequality. For example, public sector wages in countries with a small formal sector, 
such as in Sub-Saharan Africa, could have a significant effect on private sector wages (Rama, 
2000). Finally, the impact of separation costs on employment and on income distribution 
depends on the tightness of job security regulations. Fallon and Lucas (1991) have found that 
very strict regulations on job security have depressed labor demand in India and Zimbabwe. 
Also, it has been shown that separation costs—in the form of mandatory severance payments—
may reduce the level of employment (Heckman and Pagés, 2000). 
Rama (2003) analyzes the impact of labor market interventions on indicators of income 
inequality after controlling for some of their determinants.
2 He shows that social security 
programs help reduce income inequality. Collective bargaining, however, is less effective in 
improving income distribution, with a statistically significant impact only on the share of the 
second-richest quintile of the population. On the other hand, the “core” ILO conventions seem 
ineffective in reducing inequality.
3 In summary, he finds that countries pushing to adopt ILO 
labor standards, higher minimum wages, or to expand government employment, may not 
generate any significant effect on inequality. 
Finally, Vanhoudt (1997) analyzes the impact of labor market policies on income 
inequality in OECD countries. He finds that the Gini coefficient is not affected by labor market 
policies. However, they affect other measures of inequality. Specifically, he finds that active 
                                                 
2 Rama (2003) includes as determinants of income inequality educational attainment, civil liberties, and financial 
development, among others. 
  8labor market policies—e.g., expenditures for public employment services, labor market training, 
and subsidized employment, among others—improve the income share of the bottom quintiles of 
the population and reduce the income gap between top and bottom quintiles. On the other hand, 
passive labor markets—i.e., income compensation schemes—have only a negligible impact.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
In the present section we describe the database used in our regression analysis, as well as the 
estimation strategy. Since our discussion will draw heavily from Calderón and Chong (2004), we 
will present a brief description of both the data and the methodology used. For further detail, see 





To test whether labor regulations have been an effective tool to reduce income inequality, we use 
two recently developed databases on labor regulations: (a) the RA database (Rama and Artecona, 
2002), and (b) the BDLLS database (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2003). 
  
3.1.1 The RA Database 
 
Rama and Artecona have collected data for 121 countries on labor market regulations and 
outcomes over the period 1945-49. The data are organized by 5-year period averages and 
distinguish between regulation on paper and regulation in practice.  Regulation on paper—or de 
jure regulation—is approximated by the number of ILO standards ratified by the national labor 
laws.
5 On the other hand, regulation in practice—or de facto regulation—is approximated by 
information on categories such as minimum wages, conditions of work and benefits, trade unions 
and collective bargaining, and public sector employment.  The distinction between de jure and de 
facto regulations is very important, since developing countries’ ability to enforce the regulations 
stipulated in labor laws is quite limited (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997).  
                                                                                                                                                             
3 According to Rama, the “core” ILO conventions are those that call for the abolition of forced labor, the effective 
elimination of child labor, nondiscrimination in the workplace, and freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining. 
4 This sub-section draws heavily on Calderón and Chong (2004). 
5 Among the conventions ratified and included in this index, we have universal legislation on issues such as child 
labor, compulsory labor, equal remuneration for male and female workers, equal opportunity, the right of collective 
bargaining, and organization in unions, among others. 
  9In order to define the aggregate indices of the overall extent of labor regulations in the 
economy, we follow the strategy pursued by Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2001). We 
define an index of regulation on paper, L0, as the cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified 
by a country over time. This index reflects the ideal regulatory framework of the country from an 
institutionalist point of view (Freeman, 1993), but it also captures the thickness of the labor code 
(Forteza and Rama, 2001). The L0 index includes the ratification of ILO conventions on 
minimum age of employment, compulsory labor, the abolition of forced labor, equal male-
female remuneration, the right for collective bargaining, and discrimination or inequality of 
opportunity or conditions of employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, political opinion or 
social origin.  However, the number of existing regulations does not give us information on the 
ability of the country to implement and enforce these regulations. For this reason, we require an 
index that reflects the extent of labor regulations instead of their number.  
Rama (1995) constructs an aggregate index of regulations in practice using information 
on the following four categories: minimum wages (MW), mandated benefits (MB), trade unions 
(TU) and public sector employment (GE). Unfortunately, data on job separation costs is 
available only for a very limited sample of countries.
6  Following Rama (1995) and Forteza and 
Rama (2001), we construct two aggregate indices of labor regulations in practice, both including 
different proxies for these four dimensions. The first aggregate index of labor regulations in 
practice, L1, is the simple average of the ratio of the minimum wage to unit labor costs in the 
manufacturing sector (MW), social security contributions as a percentage of salaries (MB), total 
trade union membership as a percentage of total labor force (TU), and the share of general 
government employment in total employment (GE). On the other hand, the second aggregate 
index of regulations in practice, L2, is also the simple average of the ratio of minimum wage to 
income per capita (MW), the number of days of maternity leave for a first child born without 
complications (MB), the ratification of ILO Convention 87 that allows workers to organize in 
trade unions (TU), and the ratio of central government employment to total employment (GE).   
In order to make all these variables comparable across countries, we normalized all the 
labor market regulation indicators so that their values range between 0 and 1.  Countries with the 
highest (lowest) extent of labor regulation have a score of 1 (0). In addition, the aggregate 
                                                 
6 Heckman and Pagés (2000) constructed data on job separation costs for Latin America and found that these costs 
have a substantial impact on the level of employment in the region. 
  10indices of regulation in practice, L1 or L2, are computed for countries with at least 2 of the 4 
dimensions involved in the analysis. 
 
3.1.2 The BDLLS Database 
 
Based on the labor codes of 85 countries across the world, BDLLS (2003) evaluated the degree 
of regulations in the labor markets. They specifically evaluated the extent of regulations 
stipulated in three types of labor laws: employment laws, industrial relations laws, and social 
security laws.  We should note that we only have a cross-section of labor regulation indices for a 
broad sample of countries.  
Employment laws encompass laws governing the employment contracts of individuals in 
the economy. This type of law specifically regulates individual labor contracts, terms of 
reference and termination of contracts, involving restrictions placed on alternative employment 
contracts, conditions of the employment contract and job security. 
Industrial relations laws regulate the adoption, bargaining, and enforcement of collective 
agreements, the unionization of workers, and industrial actions by workers and employers. These 
laws address aspects of the worker-employer relationship such as collective bargaining, the 
participation of workers in company management, and the resolution of collective disputes by 
means such as strikes and lockouts. 
Finally, social security laws involve the social response to quality-of-life conditions and 
requirements. Specifically, social security laws protect workers against the risk of disability, 
sickness and unemployment.  It should be noted that, since most of these measures are drawn 
from labor codes, they are closer in spirit to de jure labor rigidities than the measures cited 
above. 
 
3.1.3 Income Inequality and its Determinants 
 
The dependent variable in our regression analysis is the Gini coefficient. Our main source of data 
is the information gathered by Deininger and Squire (1996). However, we only have information 
from this source until 1995. For the final 5 years we extrapolated data for income shares and the 
Gini coefficient for the countries included in Milanovic (2002a, 2002b). In addition, for the 
countries not included in Milanovic’s work, we generated information on the Gini coefficient 
based on the coefficient of variation of income and the income’s linear correlation of income, 
  11with ranks as in Milanovic (1997). We also use the income shares of top, bottom and middle 
quintiles of the population. This will allow us to analyze the robustness of our results to changes 
in the dependent variable as well as assess the impact of labor market policies on the income of 
the poor. 
Following the empirical literature on income distribution (Milanovic, 2000; Gradstein, 
Milanovic and Ying, 2001; Calderón and Chong, 2001; Clarke, Xu and Zou, 2003), we choose 
the set of determinants of income inequality. We include the (log) level of GDP per capita as 
well as its square value. This variable is obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.1 compiled by 
Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). The squared specification of GDP per capita will allow us to 
test for the presence of the Kuznets curve, that is, whether income inequality rises in the early 
stages of development and declines in later stages. We also consider indicators of education like 
the level of secondary schooling from Barro and Lee (2001), and of financial depth such as the 
ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000). The 
number of physicians (per 1,000 people) is included as a proxy for improvements in the health 
sector. Macroeconomic instability is proxied by the CPI inflation rate, and the size of the modern 
sector is calculated as the share of industry and services in the economy’s total value added.  
 
3.2 The Methodology 
 
3.2.1 The Regression Framework 
 
Our main goal is to assess the impact of labor regulations on income distribution by running the 
following regression: 
 
it it it t i it L X y ξ β η µ + Γ + + + =      (1) 
 
According to equation (1), income inequality in country i during period t, yit, depends upon a set 
of determinants described by the matrix Xit, as well as unobserved country and period-specific 
effects, µi and ηt, respectively.  Our set of long-term growth determinants follows the work of 
Milanovic (2000), Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying (2001) and Calderón and Chong (2001).   
Among the determinants of income inequality we include: the initial level of output per capita (in 
logs) and output per capita squared, human capital, financial depth, health, inflation, and the size 
of the modern sector.  
  12We also included in our income inequality regression framework a set of variables that 
captures the extent of regulations in the labor markets, as represented by the matrix Lit in 
equation (1).  This matrix L includes different indicators that focus on specific policies or 
institutions in the labor market such as minimum wages, mandatory benefits, trade union 
membership, government employment, social security laws, and collective bargaining, among 




it 1 = l . The larger the values of 
these   variables, the more regulated labor markets are. We do not assume that labor 





it 1 = l
We normalize these variables in such a way that they are equal to one (zero) if labor 
markets are fully regulated (deregulated).
7 If our dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, a 
negative estimate for the parameters in the Γ matrix implies that de-regulating labor markets may 
enhance the distribution of income. 
There are additional problems when we attempt to run a regression of equation (1), that 
is, we may find that some variables in the Lit may be highly correlated with each other. In fact, 
trade unions and public employment display the highest correlation (0.8), whereas mandated 
benefits and minimum wages have a correlation of 0.5. In this case, we may be unable to identify 
the parameters of the Γmatrix. To address this issue, we create aggregate indices of labor market 
regulations as in Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2001). We compute a simple average of 
the normalized values of our labor regulation indicators as described above.
8  Hence, we use the 
aggregate index of regulations in the labor market,  , to test the overall effects of labor market 
regulation on income inequality. We reformulate our income inequality regression equation in 





it A it t i it X y ξ γ β η µ + + + + = l      (2) 
                                                 
7 In order to aggregate the variables, we first need to normalize them since not all of them are expressed in 





min l  and { }
k
max l  as the closest and farthest a country can get to perfect competition in the labor markets. Hence, 
















8 In principle, we compute the average of J out of the K relevant labor market rigidities (where J ≤ K). Note that our 
aggregate index takes values between zero and one. But unless all of the labor market rigidities are perfectly 
  13 
The nature and magnitude of the overall impact of labor market regulations on income 
inequality are captured by the sign and size of  A γ . However, individual regulations may have 
different consequences that may cancel each other to some extent in the aggregate. One of the 
shortcomings of a significant parameter estimate for  A γ  is that its sign may not help in 
identifying the specific regulations that need to be reformulated. Hence, we still need to estimate 
the individual effect of different regulations as captured by the  j γ  parameters.  
If we replace the aggregate index l  in (2) by one of our individual measures of labor 
market regulations, the coefficient estimate will be biased due to omitted variables. That is, the 
coefficient of the individual regulation will capture the effects of the labor market rigidity k, but 
also (partly) those of all of the other missing rigidities. Since they are likely to be correlated with 
each other, the value obtained for 
A
it
k γ  might be reflecting the effects of these other rigidities. We 
can partially solve this problem by defining “complementary” labor market regulations, 
k
it
− l ~ , as 
the average of the indicators that are different from k. This complementary variable can be used 
to control for all other labor market features, apart from 
k






it k it t i it X y ξ γ γ β η µ + + + + + =
−
− l l ~ ~
    (3) 
 
where the coefficient  k γ  captures the effect of labor market rigidity k on long-term growth.  
 
3.2.2 The Estimation Strategy
9 
 
We estimate our regression equation in two dimensions: cross-section and panel data. Our cross-
section regressions are estimated using least squares with robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
Then we use an IV estimator where we control for the endogeneity of labor market regulations 
using a set of instruments outlined by BDLLS (2003). The outline of the IV strategy will be 
discussed when we analyze the panel data techniques. 
For the panel estimation of equations (2) and (3), we first use a series of least-squares-
based estimators: (i) the pooled OLS estimator, which is the simplest regression technique given 
                                                                                                                                                             
correlated with each other, the actual range of variation across countries should be significantly narrower for the 
aggregate measures than for any of the individual indicators. 
9 Here, we heavily draw on Calderón and Chong (2004). 
  14that we do not account for either unobserved effects or endogeneity; (ii) the time-effects 
estimator—least squares with time dummies—where we can explain differences in income 
inequality across country due to differences in the extent of labor market regulations; and (iii) the 
within-group or country-effects estimator—least squares with country dummies—where we 
analyze the movement of income inequality indicators in a country in relation to changes in its 
labor market regulations. 
To complement these least-squares-based estimation techniques, we control for 
endogenous regressors. Hence, we present several estimators from the family of the Instrumental 
Variables (IV). In general, because it is very likely that labor regulations are partly endogenous, 
we focus our final analysis on techniques that account for the endogeneity problems.  We will 
tackle this issue using two different strategies. 
Our first strategy will use IV techniques where we select “external instruments” for labor 
regulations, and we will present pooled IV estimates, IV with time effects, and IV with country 
effects. This set of instruments follows the literature on the choice of labor regulations as 
outlined by BDLLS (2003).  According to these authors, the choice of labor regulations across 
countries is explained by efficiency considerations, political power theories, and legal theories. 
North (1981) claims that a set of regulations is usually chosen based on an efficiency 
criterion. The efficiency theory focuses on the distinction between regulation and social 
insurance. It has been argued that social insurance may be an efficient way to deal with market 
failures in countries with lower social marginal cost of tax revenues—i.e., richer countries 
(Becker and Mulligan, 1998). Poor countries regulate to protect workers from being mistreated 
by employers, while rich countries provide unemployment insurance, sick leave, and early 
retirement since they can raise taxes more cheaply to finance such operations (Blanchard, 2000). 
On the other hand, the efficiency theory may argue the opposite. Government officials may use 
labor regulations to force firms to hire and keep excess labor or to empower unions friendly with 
the government. In this case, countries with better governance have a comparative advantage at 
regulation relative to other forms of social control of business. 
According to political power theories, institutions are designed to transfer resources from 
those out of power to those in political power (Olson, 1993). Hence, institutions would be 
inefficient and designed to be so by political leaders to help themselves and their favored groups. 
It is argued that regulations protecting workers are introduced by socialist, social-democratic, 
  15and more generally leftist governments to benefit their political constituencies (Hicks, 1999). In 
addition, labor regulations are a response to the pressure from trade unions, and the degree of 
regulations should be higher when unions are more powerful. Dictatorships are less constrained 
than democratically elected governments and therefore will have more redistributive laws and 
institutions. Constitutions, legislative constraints, and other forms of checks and balances are all 
conducive to fewer regulations (Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). 
Likewise, open economies may find it expensive to introduce regulations, since competition 
makes it less lucrative for governments to raise firms’ regulatory costs (Ades and Di Tella, 
1999).  
Finally, legal theories suggest that the legal tradition is at the root of the way countries 
control economic activities (BDLLS, 2003). Common law countries tend to rely more on 
markets and contracts, civil law countries on regulation, and socialist countries on state 
ownership.
10 This implies that civil law countries and socialist law countries should regulate 
labor markets more extensively than common law countries. Common law countries may also 
have a less generous social security system since they rely on markets to provide insurance.  
After this brief description of the different theories explaining the choice of labor 
regulation, our set of instruments is the following: (a) For efficiency purposes, we use (the log 
of) GDP per capita. (b) Testing the political power theories implies testing the significance of the 
index of institutionalized autocracy from the Polity IV Codebook (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003), 
the political orientation of the government and congress to the left (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001), and measures of trade openness. (c) We include the dummy variables for 
countries with British common law, and German civil code to test the legal theories (La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
                                                 
10 Common law emerged in England. It is mostly characterized by decision-making by juries and independent 
judges, stressing the role of judicial discretion as opposed to codes. Common law was transmitted to the British 
colonies (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and other countries in Southeast Asia, East Africa, 
and the Caribbean). On the other hand, civil law evolved from Roman law in Western Europe and was incorporated 
into civil codes in France and Germany in the nineteenth century. It is characterized by less independent judiciaries, 
the relative unimportance of juries and a greater role of both substantive and procedural codes as opposed to judicial 
discretion. French civil law was transplanted throughout Western Europe, including Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, 
and Holland, and subsequently to the colonies in North and West Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. German 
codes became accepted in Germanic Western Europe and were transferred to Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan. 
Countries under the influence of the USSR adopted socialist law, while Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and 
Finland developed an indigenous Scandinavian legal tradition (BDLLS, 2003). 
  16Our second way to tackle the endogeneity of labor rigidities is to use the GMM 
estimators developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
technique takes account of the following: First, the presence of unobserved period- and country-
specific effects. Time effects are accounted for by the inclusion of period-specific dummy 
variables, whereas country-specific effects are dealt with via differencing given the dynamic 
nature of the regression.  Second, we control for biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse 
causation.  A more detailed reference to the GMM-IV techniques is presented in Appendix II of 
Calderón and Chong (2004). 
 
4. Empirical Assessment 
 
In the present section, we present the empirical assessment of the link between income inequality 
and regulation in the labor market. We gather data for a sample of 121 countries over the 1970-
2000 period (see list of countries in Appendix). We present some basic statistics on income 
inequality and labor regulations as well as the correlation analysis. Next, we perform the 
regression analysis. Our assessment will be undertaken in two dimensions: (i) a cross-section 
analysis over the 1970-2000 period, and (ii) a panel data of 5-year average non-overlapping 
observations over the same period. 
 
4.1. Basic Statistics 
 
In Table 1 we report simple averages of the income inequality and the indicators of labor 
regulation across the world for a cross-section of countries over the 1970-2000 period. First we 
find that the distribution of income is more egalitarian among industrial nations (with an average 
Gini coefficient of 0.32) than among developing countries (0.41). Income distribution in Latin 
America (LAC) is more unequal on average than among developing countries considered as a 
whole. Second, labor codes in industrial countries (as proxied by the index L0 in the RA dataset) 
contain more regulations (i.e., ILO standards) than developing countries. Third, industrial 
countries have a greater ability to enforce regulations than developing countries (as displayed by 
indices L1 and L2 in the RA dataset), while Latin American countries are even less able to 
enforce regulations than the developing country average.  Finally, we should note the following 
among the variables in the aggregate indices L1 and L2: (a) The ratio of minimum wages to 
income per capita is larger in developing than in industrial countries. (b) The contribution to 
  17social security as a percentage of workers’ salaries is larger in industrial than in developing 
countries. (c) Trade unions are larger in industrial than in developing nations. (d) Public sector 
employment (proxied by employment in the central or general government) is larger in industrial 
countries than in developing nations.  
Using the BDLLS dataset, we find that labor codes in developing countries contain more 
regulations regarding employment laws and industrial (collective) relations laws than in 
industrial countries. Latin American countries, in particular, appear to have even more 
regulations. On the other hand, labor codes in industrial countries contain more benefits in their 
social security laws. If we look further into the components of the different aggregate indices of 
laws protecting workers, we find that: (a) Regulations on the conditions of employment are 
significantly greater among developing nations than among industrial countries; (b) Industrial 
countries have more regulations regarding the participation of workers in management than 
developing countries, although the latter group has more regulations on collective bargaining and 
collective disputes; (c) Workers in industrial countries are more protected than in developing 
countries in terms of the benefits stipulated in their social security laws, especially in the area of 
unemployment benefits (for further details, see Table 1). 
In Table 2, we present the evolution of the sample averages by decade over the 1970-
2000 period. Our panel statistics are reported for the sample of all countries as well as for the 
sample of industrial and developing countries. We first find that income inequality has decreased 
over time regardless of the sample of countries evaluated. Gini coefficients have decreased (from 
0.40 over the 1970s to 0.38 over the 1990s), income shares of top quintiles have decreased and 
income shares of middle and bottom quintiles have increased (see Table 2). Second, labor codes 
have incorporated more ILO standards over time. Specifically, the index L0 has increased from 
0.27 in the 1970s to 0.32 in the 1990s for the full sample of countries. Third, the enforcement of 
labor regulations has also increased on average over time for the full sample of countries 
(whether we use the aggregate index L1 or L2). However, we observe that whereas labor markets 
were slightly deregulated among industrial countries in the 1990s (relative to the 1980s), labor 
regulations have increased among developing countries. Finally, a closer look into the 
components of the aggregate indices L1 and L2 yields the following: (a) The decline in the 
aggregate indices L1 and L2 among developing countries is mainly attributed to the reduction in 
public sector employment (as a percentage to total employment) and the reduction of the 
  18percentage of workers in labor unions. (b) The increase in aggregate indices L1 and L2 among 
developing nations is explained by upward trends in minimum wages and social security 
contributions (for additional details, see Table 2). 
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
 
Cross-Section Correlations. In Table 3, we present the correlation analysis of income inequality 
and labor regulation indicators for the full sample of countries as well as industrial and 
developing countries.
11 For the sake of robustness, we use not only different sets of labor market 
rigidity indicators, but also different measures of income inequality, namely Gini coefficients 
and income shares. We first present the cross-section correlation between inequality and the 
labor regulation indicators in the RA dataset (see panel I of Table 3). In general, we find that 
labor regulation on paper and in practice (as proxied by the aggregate indices L0, L1 and L2) has 
a negative association with the Gini coefficient for the full sample of countries (see Figures 1 
through 3). We should also note that these labor regulation indices have a negative correlation 
with the income shares of the top quintiles of the population and a positive association with the 
income shares of the middle and bottom quintiles (see Table 3).  We specifically find that the 
aggregate index of “de facto” rigidities L1 has a larger negative correlation with the Gini 
coefficient than L2 (-0.46 vs. -0.12).  
A further look at the correlation between income inequality (as proxied by the Gini 
coefficient) and the aggregate indices of labor regulation yields: (a) Minimum wages and trade 
union membership in the L1 index display the largest correlation with the Gini coefficient 
(approximately -0.5). (b) Trade union membership and public sector employment in the L2 index 
exhibit the largest negative association with the Gini coefficient (with a correlation coefficient of 
approximately -0.1). This preliminary evidence suggests that the countries with more labor 
regulations (independently of whether they are de jure or de facto) usually display lower levels 
of income inequality.  
Next we analyze the cross-section correlation between income inequality and the labor 
regulation indicators in the BDLLS dataset (see panel II of Table 3). We find that (the aggregate 
index of) employment laws (as well as their different sub-indices) are positively correlated with 
                                                 
11 For reasons of space, we will not comment on the results for the full sample of countries. If necessary, we will 
point out some differences in the correlation analysis between industrial and developing countries. 
  19the Gini coefficient—with the largest positive correlation displayed by regulations on job 
security (see Figure 4). Also, we find a negative association between the index of industrial 
relations laws and the Gini coefficient that is mainly driven by worker participation in 
management (see Figure 5). On the other hand, the other two components of that aggregate index 
(collective bargaining and collective disputes) exhibit a positive correlation with income 
inequality. Finally, we find a negative degree of association between social security laws and the 
Gini coefficient—displaying the largest negative coefficient among aggregate indices at -0.38 
(see Figure 6). Among the different benefits covered by social security laws, unemployment 
benefits display the largest negative correlation with the Gini coefficient (-0.47), while sickness 
and health benefits display the smallest correlation (-0.17). In summary, we observe that 
countries with more egalitarian distribution usually display a better social security environment 
(with a legal framework that entails more old age, sickness and unemployment benefits than in 
other countries). 
 
Panel Data Correlations. In Table 4 we display the panel data correlation analysis between the 
Gini coefficient and the different indicators of labor market regulations from the RA database. 
We find that for most of our indicators (aggregate indices and individual categories) there is an 
unconditional negative correlation between income inequality and regulations in the labor 
market. The correlation coefficient between L0 and the Gini coefficient is -0.32, while the 
correlation between L1 and income inequality is higher than the correlation with L2 (-0.47 as 
opposed to -0.20).
12 
Regarding the evolution of the correlation between these variables over decades, we first 
find that the correlation between income inequality and labor regulation on paper (L0) is negative 
in all decades, although it decreases from -0.34 in the 1970s to -0.30 in the 1990s. In the case of 
regulations in practice (as proxied by the aggregate indices L1 and L2), we find that after 
decreasing in the 1980s with respect to the previous decade, the correlations have increased in 
the 1990s (although very slightly for L1). Finally, note that regulations on minimum wages 
                                                 
12 The largest negative correlation among the categories of the aggregate L1 index is trade union membership (-0.5), 
followed by general government employment (-0.36) and social security contribution (-0.3). The smallest correlation 
is exhibited by minimum wages (-0.10). On the other hand, maternity days of leave and trade union membership (as 
proxied by the ratification of ILO Convention 87) show a negative correlation with the Gini coefficient among the 
L2 components (-0.31 and -0.18, respectively), while minimum wages and central government employment display 
a positive correlation (0.16 and 0.03, respectively). 
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with income inequality for industrial countries. For developing countries, the positive correlation 
has been found only for minimum wages normalized by income per capita. Of course, one needs 
to control for other determinants of inequality and the possible reverse causation in order to 
properly conclude whether labor regulations affect inequality. 
 
4.3 Cross-Section Regression Analysis 
 
We first analyze the impact of labor regulations on income inequality for our cross-section of 
121 countries over the 1970-2000 period. We first analyze our cross-section OLS estimates, and 
then we instrument for labor regulation in our simple IV estimates. In Tables 5 and 6 we present 
the results of OLS and IV estimates, respectively, reporting the coefficient of all regressors, the 
two samples, and the three aggregate labor regulations variables constructed from each data set.  
In Table 7 we present both the OLS and IV estimates only of our coefficient of interest, namely 
the coefficient of the labor regulation indicator, for both samples.
13 In this table, we report the 
coefficient, its standard error and the coefficient of determination (R squared) of the full 
regression.
14 Our dependent variable is the Gini coefficient and, for robustness, we also report 
regression results for the income shares of selected quintiles of the population. Our discussion of 
the OLS results will focus on the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. 
Regulations on paper L0 do not seem to have a significant relationship with income 
inequality regardless of the sample and estimation technique used. The index L1 of regulations in 
practice has a negative coefficient that is significant only for the OLS regression for developing 
countries. On the other hand, the index L2 has no significant association with the Gini 
coefficient. Note that using our IV estimates, we find that the following variables have a robust 
negative impact on the Gini coefficient across samples: the share of unionized labor, the share of 
                                                 
13 Following the strategy applied by Calderón and Chong (2004), we find instruments for the indicators of labor 
market rigidities according to the literature summarized by BDLLS (2003).  Among our main findings is that that 
labor markets are more regulated in richer countries, and in left-oriented governments. On the other hand, countries 
with common law (British legal tradition) are less regulated. In addition, labor regulations (proxied by employment 
laws, industrial relations laws and social security laws) are fewer in richer countries, in more open countries, and in 
countries with a British legal tradition. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the first stage regression results. 
However, they are available from the authors upon request. 
14 The income inequality regression includes the following explanatory variables: output per capita (in logs), output 
per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians (per 1,000 
people), and the different indicators of labor regulation. A full report of the regression results is available from the 
authors upon request.  
  21general government employment, and the ratio of minimum wages to income per capita. Using 
their estimated coefficients in Table 7, we can infer that: (i) a one-standard-deviation increase in 
trade union membership and public employment will reduce the Gini coefficient (0-1) by 0.094 
and 0.082, respectively. (b) An analogous increase in the ratio of minimum wages to income per 
capita will increase income inequality by 0.15 over the 30-year period. Finally, we find that, 
using the ratio between L1 (L2) and L0 as a measure of compliance, the first ratio significantly 
improves income inequality in both samples.  
Using the BDLLS indicators of labor regulations (panel II of Table 7) we find that the 
aggregate index of employment laws has a positive and significant relationship with the Gini 
coefficient regardless of the sample and estimation technique used. This positive relationship is 
mainly explained by regulations on alternative employment contracts. Second, industrial 
relations laws have a positive association with inequality, although significant only using IV. 
This effect on inequality is attributed to regulations on collective bargaining and collective 
disputes. Finally, social security laws also have a positive relationship with inequality, which is 
significant only using OLS and mainly attributed to the significance of regulations on sickness 
and health benefits. Economically speaking, a one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregate 
index of employment laws and industrial relations laws will increase the Gini coefficient (0-1) by 
0.02 over the 30-year period (that is, it moves from an average of 0.39 for the full sample of 
countries to 0.37). We should mention that an analogous increase in the regulations of both 
collective bargaining and disputes has a stronger negative impact on the distribution of income. 
That is, the Gini coefficient increases by 0.04 and 0.10 over the 30-year period. 
 
4.4 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
 
After performing our cross-section regression analysis, we evaluate the relationship between 
labor market regulations and income inequality using a panel data set of 5-year non-overlapping 
observations during the 1970-2000 period. We take advantage of the additional dimension (i.e., 
the time dimension) to draw some inferences on the impact of labor market regulations on 
income inequality with robust panel data estimation techniques. 
 
  224.4.1 Simple Techniques 
 
We first characterize the relationship between labor market regulations and income inequality 
using simpler techniques such as pooled, time fixed-effects and country fixed effects OLS. While 
the pooled OLS does not take into account unobserved specific effects and endogeneity of the 
regressors, time fixed effects and country fixed effects isolate these unobserved effects. Next, we 
account for the possible endogeneity of our labor regulation variable by using some exogenous 
instruments. Here we report estimates using IV and IV with time effects and with fixed country 
effects. In the next subsection, we will present estimates using the GMM-IV system estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which takes into 
account the unobserved effects and endogeneity by using both internal instruments and the 
exogenous instruments for the labor regulation indicators. Since the latter method is our 
preferred estimation technique, we will put more emphasis on these estimates for our discussion 
of the results. 
Our regression analysis using OLS and IV estimates (pooled, time- and country-effects) 
of income inequality and aggregate indices labor regulations on paper (L0) and in practice (L1 
and L2) are presented in Tables 8.1 to 8.3. Our specification includes other explanatory variables 
such as output per capita (in logs), and output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid 
liabilities (as percentage to GDP), the number of physicians (per 1,000 people), the CPI inflation 
rate, and the size of the modern sector.
15  Table 9 reports the coefficient estimate of the different 
measures of labor regulations.  
Focusing on IV estimates—given that in principle they tackle the endogeneity problem—
we find that labor regulations de jure generally have no significant relationship with income 
inequality in almost all cases. However, L0 has a negative and significant impact on inequality 
for the world sample using our country-effects estimator. Index L1 has a negative and significant 
impact on inequality in developing countries when using the country-effects estimator, while L2 
has no significant impact on income distribution regardless of the sample. In addition, if we look 
at the components of L1, the share of unionized labor and the size of public employment seem to 
drive down inequality among developing countries. On the other hand, when we analyze the 
                                                 
15 In general, we find that there is a non-linear relationship between income inequality and output per capita that is 
consistent with the Kuznets Curve hypothesis (an U-inverted curve for the Gini coefficient). We also find that 
countries with more equal income distribution seem to also have a higher stock of human capital, deeper financial 
  23components of L2, we find that maternity leave and public employment have a negative and 
significant effect on the Gini coefficient for developing countries (see Table 9). 
 
4.4.2 The GMM-IV System Estimator 
 
In Section 4.4.1 we used simpler panel data techniques that allowed us to characterize the 
relationship between income inequality and labor market regulations. In this section, we will use 
the GMM-IV system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The GMM-IV system estimator is our preferred estimator for two reasons. First, it 
accounts for (unobserved) country-specific effects that may bias our estimates. Specifically, we 
eliminate the control for the presence of time effects with time dummies, and we eliminate the 
country-specific effects by expressing our equation in differences. Second, this estimator 
controls for the possibility of endogenous regressors. We use both internal instruments (i.e., 
lagged levels as instrument for the differences, and lagged differences as instruments for the 
levels) and other exogenous instruments for labor regulations suggested by the theory (i.e., legal 
and institutional variables). To confirm the validity of our income inequality regressions, we 
compute the following specification tests: (a) a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the validity of the moment conditions that we set up to perform the IV regressions, and (b) 
tests of higher-order serial correlation.
16  In general, the specification tests validate our 
regressions for statistical inference. That is, our instruments are valid according to the Sargan 
test, and we reject the possibility of our errors displaying high-order serial correlation.  
Before we discuss our results on the variable of interest (i.e., labor market regulations), 
we briefly comment on the coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables. First, we 
find evidence in favor of the Kuznets hypothesis. That is, income inequality increases in the 
early stages of development, and then decreases in the later stages.  On average, the turning point 
for the GDP (in logs) in the full sample of countries is 8.1 (approximately the initial level of 
GDP per capita in Morocco during the 1996-2000 period), whereas the mean in the regression 
sample is 8.6 (Colombia during the same period). Second, a larger stock of human capital (as 
proxied by a larger enrollment rate in secondary education or a larger number of physicians per 
                                                                                                                                                             
systems, better health systems, lower macroeconomic instability, and a larger agricultural sector (see Tables 8.1 to 
8.3 for more details). 
16 Recall that, by construction, our error terms displays first-order serial correlation. For more technical details on 
the estimation technique, see Calderón and Chong (2004). 
  241,000 people) may help reduce income inequality. Deeper financial systems also drive down 
inequality. On the other hand, income inequality will increase if the country has higher inflation 
or if the modern sector is larger, although we should note that the coefficient estimate of inflation 
is not robust (see Table 10 for more details). 
Now we turn to the effect of labor market regulations on income inequality. First, we find 
that regulations on paper, as proxied by L0, have a positive and significant impact on the Gini 
coefficient for the full sample of countries, as well as for the sample of developing countries. 
Hence, income inequality is worsened by the adoption of a larger number of ILO standards.  A 
one-standard-deviation increase in L0 (0.21 for the full sample of countries) would reduce the 
Gini coefficient by 0.01. On the other hand, an analogous increase in L0 for developing countries 
(0.18) would raise the Gini coefficient by 0.025. We should note that the standard deviation 
increase in L0—0.21 for the full sample of countries—is much larger than the average observed 
in 1996-2000 with respect to 1976-80 (0.06). Such a change over that period has only occurred in 
Spain, Finland, Brazil and Uruguay (i.e., an increase of approximately 0.21 in the normalized 
number of ILO standards in 1996-2000 relative to 1976-80). However, we should take this result 
with caution. Reducing the number of regulations contained in the labor codes does not 
guarantee that the enforcement abilities of the regulators will be enhanced. 
In contrast to our results for regulations on paper, we find that our indices of labor 
regulations in practice—either L1 or L2—have a negative and significant coefficient estimate for 
the full sample of countries as well as among developing countries. Hence, labor market 
regulations in countries with better law-enforcement capabilities would reduce income 
inequality. In effect, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in L1 (0.13) may reduce 
income inequality by 0.037. In addition, an analogous increase in L2 (0.15) may reduce the Gini 
coefficient by 0.033. An analogous increase in the extent of de facto regulations would cause a 
decline of the Gini coefficient between 0.028 (when L1 declines) and 0.032 (when L2 declines).
17 
In Table 11 we report the sensitivity analysis of our coefficient estimates of labor 
regulations to changes in (i) the indicator of labor regulation used in the regression. Here we use 
the different components of the aggregate indices used in Table 10. (ii) The proxy of income 
                                                 
17 The L1 index in Jordan, South Africa and Bangladesh has increased more than one standard deviation, whereas the 
L1 index in Israel, Syria, United Kingdom, Australia and Bulgaria has decreased one standard deviation or more in 
1996-00 relative to 1976-80. On the other hand, the L2 index in Bangladesh, Venezuela, Romania, and Turkey has 
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income share of selected quintiles of the population. 
We first analyze the impact of the different individual measures of labor market 
regulations on the Gini coefficient. The negative impact of L1 on income inequality for the full 
sample of countries is mainly attributed to a negative and significant impact of social security 
contribution, trade unions, and government employment. We specifically find that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the contribution to the social security reduces the Gini coefficient 
by 0.008, whereas analogous increases in trade union membership and public employment 
generate declines in the Gini coefficient of 0.028 and 0.01, respectively.  In the case of the 
negative impact of L2, we find negative and significant effects on income inequality from 
maternity leave and trade unions—as proxied by the ratification of the ILO convention on 
organized labor. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in mandated benefits—as 
proxied by a one-standard-deviation increase in days of maternity leave—may reduce the Gini 
coefficient by 0.01.  When we restrict our regression analysis to developing countries, mandated 
benefits—i.e., social security contribution—drive the redistributive impact of L1, whereas 
maternity leave and trade unions drive the redistributive effects of L2. The impact of a one- 
standard-deviation increase in mandated benefits among developing nations generates a 
reduction in the Gini coefficient of 0.012 regardless of the proxy used.  
We next analyze the impact of the different aggregate indices on the incomes shares of 
the top, middle, and bottom quintiles of the population. Our index of regulations on paper, L0, 
has a positive but not significant impact on the income shares of the top quintiles. However, it 
has a negative and significant impact on the income share of the middle class, as proxied by the 
income share of the middle quintile, and the poor, as proxied by the share of the bottom quintile. 
A one standard-deviation-increase in the (normalized) number of ILO standards ratified would 
reduce the income shares of the middle and bottom quintiles by 0.005 and 0.003, respectively. 
For the sample of developing countries, regulations on paper have a positive and significant 
relationship with the income share of the second largest quintile (Top 40), and a negative and 
significant relationship with the middle and bottom quintiles. A one-standard-deviation increase 
                                                                                                                                                             
increased by at least one standard deviation, while the index for Niger, Bahrain, and New Zealand has decreased one 
standard deviation or more. 
  26in L0 will raise the income share of the Top 40 by 0.03, and reduce the income share of the 
middle and bottom quintiles by 0.015 and 0.008, respectively. 
On the other hand, L1 has a positive and significant impact on the top shares and a 
negative and significant effect on the middle and bottom shares, while social security 
contribution is the dimension that reduces the income share of the top quintiles and increases the 
income share of the middle quintile. Specifically, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in social security contribution (0.22) may help reduce the income share of the top quintiles 
around 0.01, increase marginally the income share of the middle quintile by 0.003, and reduce 
the income share of the bottom quintiles between 0.008 and 0.04. Besides social security, active 
labor policies that raise public employment also work as an effective tool in raising the income 
share of the bottom quintiles of the population (although the economic impact is negligible). 
When we analyze the sample of developing countries, we find that the redistributive impact of L1 
across income shares is mainly attributable to mandated benefits, proxied by the social security 
contribution as a percentage of salaries. The redistributive effects of higher social security 
contributions are larger than when we analyze the full sample of countries. A one-standard- 
deviation increase in the social security contribution would reduce the shares of the top quintiles 
between 0.018 and 0.02, increase the middle quintile by 0.01, and raise the income share of the 
bottom quintiles between 0.004 and 0.011.  
In addition, an increase in labor market regulations—approximated by a decline in the L2 
index—would reduce the income shares of the top quintiles of the population, and increase the 
income shares of the bottom quintiles. Its impact on the income share of the middle quintile is 
statistically negligible. The redistributive effects across income shares are basically attributed to 
mandated benefits, as proxied by the number of days of maternity leave. A one-standard- 
deviation increase in mandated benefits (i.e., maternity leave) would reduce the shares of the top 
quintiles between 0.013 and 0.0171, increase the middle quintile by 0.004, and raise the income 
share of the bottom quintiles between 0.005 and 0.01. We further find, consistent with the impact 
of L1 on developing countries, that the number of days of maternity leave (our proxy for 
mandated benefits) drives the redistributive effects of L2 in developing nations. The quantitative 
effects of higher mandated benefits are similar to those found for the full sample of countries. 
Finally, an increase in our measures of compliance, as proxied by a lower gap between 
regulations on paper and in practice, will significantly improve income inequality. This 
  27proposition holds for the full sample of countries when the gap is measured with L1, and for the 
sample of developing countries regarding the measure of regulations in practice used.  If the 
compliance in the extent of regulations in the labor markets improves, as proxied by a decrease 
in the gap between the L0 and L1 indices, the Gini coefficient would decrease between 0.03 
(when using the full sample regressions) and 0.05 (when using the developing country 
regressions). 
 
4.5 A Scorecard on the Redistributive Benefits of Labor Regulations 
 
Like Calderón and Chong (2004), we construct a scorecard to evaluate the redistributive benefits 
of labor market regulations for the full sample of countries and for the sample of developing 
countries. In this case, we evaluate the relationship between our indicators of labor regulations 
and inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient, and income shares of the top, middle and 
bottom 20 percent of the population. Again, we summarize the information from our different 
panel estimations by imputing the value of -1 (+1) to a negative (positive) and significant 
coefficient estimate, and 0 to a non-significant coefficient. The proportion of these negative 
and/or positive coefficients is presented in Table 12. Our discussion of the summary results will 
focus on the full sample of countries. 
Regarding the relationship between labor regulations and the Gini coefficient, we find, 
first, that de jure regulations have a positive but weak relationship with income inequality. 
Second, de facto regulations—measured by either the L1 or L2 aggregate index—have a negative 
relationship with income inequality. The robust relationship between the L1 index and the Gini 
coefficient may be attributed to the redistributive effects of both trade union membership and 
public employment. On the other hand, mandated benefits (as proxied by the number of days of 
maternity leave) seem to explain the robust relationship between the L2 index and the Gini 
coefficient. Finally, our two measures of enforcement of the labor regulations seem to have a 
negative and robust relationship with the Gini coefficient.  
On the other hand, the aggregate index L1 of “de facto” labor regulations is negatively 
associated with the income share of the top 20 percent of the population, and positively 
associated with the income shares of the bottom and middle quintiles of the population. The 
negative relationship between the L1 index and the income share of the top quintile may be 
explained by the negative robust relationship with trade union membership and public 
  28employment. The positive relationship between L1 index and the income share of the bottom 
quintile may be explained by social security contribution. Finally, the aggregate index L2 of “de 
facto” labor regulations has a robust negative relationship with the income share of the top 
quintile of the population, and positive but weak associations with the income share of both 
middle and bottom quintiles of the population. The negative robust association with the income 
share of the top quintile may be attributed to mandated benefits, proxied by maternity leave 




We have analyzed the relationship between labor regulations and income inequality. Because 
there are alternative ways of measuring regulations, and perhaps more importantly, there are 
alternative estimation techniques to (imperfectly) deal with simultaneity and probable 
measurement errors, finding robust results is not a straightforward process. Nonetheless, after 
using alternative econometric approaches, considering two data sets and two alternative samples, 
there are some results that do appear to be more robust.  
The main results in our paper can be grouped into three types (see Table 12 for a 
scorecard of these results). First, we find that de jure regulations do not improve income 
distribution. The RA indicator does not have any consistent pattern, and the BDLLS indicators 
either have no effect or worsen income distribution. Second, relative compliance with existing 
regulations, particularly the ratio L1 to L0 of the RA data set seems to improve income 
distribution. It is not possible to rule out that this measure is proxying for other factors such as 
institutional development. Third, de facto regulations are overall weakly associated with 
improving income inequality. In part, this result is due to the fact that different regulations have 
quite distinct effects. In particular, we find that a higher minimum wage tends to worsen income 
distribution, whereas the extent of trade unions, the importance of government employment and 
maternity leave improve wage distribution. As mentioned above, some of these positive results 
do not carry through to the bottom quintile of the population.  
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Appendix 1. 
List of Countries 
 
Industrial Countries (22): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United States. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean (21): Argentina, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
East Asia and the Pacific (12): China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam. 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (17): Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. 
 
Middle East and North Africa (21): United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Cyprus, Algeria, Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen.  
 
South Asia (5): Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (23): Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, 
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Table 1.
Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations: Basic Statistics
Cross-Section Sample of 121 Countries, 1970-2000
Averages across Groups of Countries
Variable All Industrial Developing East Asia LAC Chile
0. Income Distribution (Deininger and Squire, 1996; Milanovic, 2000)
Gini Coefficient (0-1) 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.48 0.53
Income Shares by:
Top 20% 46.4% 39.3% 48.9% 46.8% 55.0% 61.6%
Top 40% 67.5% 62.6% 69.3% 68.3% 74.7% 77.4%
Middle 20% 15.5% 17.8% 14.8% 15.0% 13.0% 12.0%
Bottom 40% 16.9% 19.6% 16.0% 16.7% 12.2% 10.6%
Bottom 20% 6.3% 7.0% 6.0% 6.1% 4.2% 3.9%
I. Indicators of Labor Market Rigidity (Rama and Artecona, 2002)
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.30 0.49 0.25 0.09 0.34 0.33
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 0.28 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.17
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.14 0.32 0.08
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.08 -0.09 -0.16
L2 relative to L0 -0.02 -0.17 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.26
II. Indicators of Labor Regulation (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003)
(1) Employment Laws 1.53 1.36 1.60 1.39 1.79 1.46
(2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law 1.25 1.22 1.26 1.12 1.44 1.18
(3) Social Security Laws 1.70 2.21 1.53 1.58 1.69 1.98
Notes: All variables are normalized. For the mean of the different sub-categories of the aggregate indices of labor institutions, see Calderon and
Chong (2004).  
 
 





Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations: Basic Statistics over Decades
Panel Data Sample of 121 Countries, 5-year Average Observations, 1970-2000
Averages across Groups of Countries
                         1970s                          1980s                          1990s
Variable All Developing LAC Chile All Developing LAC Chile All Developing LAC Chile
0. Income Distribution (Deininger and Squire, 1996; Milanovic, 2000)
Gini Coefficient (0-1) 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.56
Income Shares by:
Top 20% 47.4% 50.4% 53.9% 59.7% 46.3% 48.8% 55.3% 64.5% 45.7% 47.9% 56.0% 60.6%
Top 40% 68.4% 70.4% 75.0% 75.0% 67.5% 69.2% 74.4% 78.3% 66.9% 68.4% 74.8% 78.9%
Middle 20% 15.2% 14.2% 12.3% 13.8% 15.6% 14.8% 13.4% 11.6% 15.8% 15.2% 13.3% 10.9%
Bottom 40% 16.4% 15.4% 12.7% 11.2% 16.9% 16.1% 12.1% 10.1% 17.3% 16.4% 11.9% 10.2%
Bottom 20% 6.1% 5.8% 4.4% 4.2% 6.3% 6.1% 4.2% 3.9% 6.5% 6.2% 4.1% 3.7%
I. Indicators of Labor Market Rigidity (Rama and Artecona, 2002)
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.27 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.39 0.36
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.20
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.06 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.06 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.11
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.15 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 -0.16
L2 relative to L0 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.26 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.26 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.26
See footnote 1.  
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Table 3.
Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality: Cross-Section Correlation Analysis
Cross-Section Sample of 121 countries, 1970-2000
Full Sample of Countries  Developing Countries
Variable Gini Top 20 Top 40 Middle 20 Bottom 40 Bottom 20 Gini Top 20 Top 40 Middle 20 Bottom 40 Bottom 20
I. Indicators of Labor Market Rigidity (Rama and Artecona, 2002)
(0) "De Jure" Index  -0.28 -0.23 -0.25 0.29 0.20 0.17 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.15 -0.02 0.02
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.46 -0.44 -0.44 0.36 0.43 0.36 -0.44 -0.39 -0.43 0.34 0.42 0.37
Minimum Wage 1/ -0.49 -0.47 -0.43 0.34 0.44 0.36 -0.48 -0.42 -0.42 0.29 0.44 0.38
Social Security Contribution -0.08 -0.15 -0.13 0.15 0.10 0.08 -0.17 -0.28 -0.27 0.25 0.26 0.28
Trade Union Membership -0.48 -0.46 -0.43 0.32 0.44 0.37 -0.42 -0.36 -0.36 0.24 0.38 0.33
General Govt. Employment -0.41 -0.40 -0.38 0.34 0.36 0.27 -0.40 -0.33 -0.35 0.28 0.35 0.30
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 0.16 0.09 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.13 0.04 0.00
Minimum Wage 2/ -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.11
Maternity Leave (# days) 0.24 0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.18 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.06 0.11
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.06 -0.10
Central Govt. Employment -0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.18 0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 0.01 0.16 0.12 -0.36 -0.43 -0.39 0.20 0.46 0.36
L2 relative to L0 0.15 0.09 0.12 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.16 -0.10 0.03 0.14 0.05
II. Indicators of Labor Regulation (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003)
(1) Employment Laws 0.10 0.09 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08
Alternative Employment Contracts 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.17 0.09 0.12 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16
Conditions of Employment 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.16 0.16 0.14 0.13
Job Security 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 0.10 0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.14
(2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.05
Collective Bargaining 0.11 0.13 0.11 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.14
Worker Participation in Management -0.23 -0.23 -0.17 0.12 0.18 0.16 -0.12 -0.17 -0.11 0.11 0.09 0.12
Collective Disputes 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.02 -0.19 -0.13 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.14 -0.12 -0.09
(3) Social Security Laws -0.38 -0.36 -0.35 0.39 0.29 0.19 -0.27 -0.21 -0.24 0.27 0.20 0.14
Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits -0.23 -0.31 -0.25 0.29 0.20 0.07 -0.10 -0.15 -0.12 0.12 0.11 0.02
Sickness and Health Benefits -0.17 -0.11 -0.15 0.22 0.10 0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 0.17 0.05 0.02
Unemployment Benefits -0.47 -0.45 -0.42 0.41 0.37 0.28 -0.36 -0.31 -0.31 0.29 0.28 0.22
Notes: 1/ Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors. 2/ Minimum wages are normalized with the real income per capita. We should mention that all labor indicators are
normalized as specified in the paper.  
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Table 4.
Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality: Panel Data Correlation Analysis
Income Inequality Indicator: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Panel Data of 121 countries, 5-year average observations, 1970-2000
Full Sample of Countries   Developing Countries
Variable 70-00 70s 80s 90s 70-00 70s 80s 90s
I. Indicators of Labor Market Rigidity (Rama and Artecona, 2002)
(0) "De Jure" Index  -0.3183 -0.3390 -0.3224 -0.2987 -0.1327 -0.1827 -0.1144 -0.1081
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.4662 -0.5071 -0.4468 -0.4531 -0.4308 -0.4561 -0.3871 -0.4487
Minimum Wage 1/ -0.0988 -0.1308 -0.0635 -0.1121 -0.1813 -0.2068 -0.1002 -0.2450
Social Security Contribution -0.2987 -0.2245 -0.2948 -0.3429 -0.2387 -0.1736 -0.2169 -0.2806
Trade Union Membership -0.5001 -0.5959 -0.4957 -0.4419 -0.4577 -0.5549 -0.4483 -0.4038
General Govt. Employment -0.3622 -0.3782 -0.3340 -0.3818 -0.2498 -0.2278 -0.1669 -0.3480
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 -0.2005 -0.2391 -0.1491 -0.2044 -0.1647 -0.1897 -0.0712 -0.2087
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.1586 0.1716 0.1759 0.1558 0.0718 0.0869 0.1060 0.0620
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.3120 -0.3581 -0.3248 -0.2881 -0.3373 -0.4083 -0.3426 -0.3272
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.1756 -0.1869 -0.1544 -0.1710 -0.0833 -0.0874 -0.0355 -0.0996
Central Govt. Employment 0.0280 0.0893 0.0682 -0.0882 0.1508 0.2841 0.1739 -0.0035
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.0183 0.0333 -0.0087 -0.0750 -0.2641 -0.1467 -0.2588 -0.3618
L2 relative to L0 0.1733 0.1869 0.2270 0.1216 -0.0451 -0.0075 0.0239 -0.1257











OLS Cross-Country Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Full Sample Developing Countries Full Sample Developing Countries
[L0] [L1] [L2] [L0] [L1] [L2] [EL0] [IR0] [SS0] [EL0] [IR0] [SS0]
Constant 0.362 -0.166 0.354 0.763 -0.375 0.700 0.235 0.460 0.188 0.534 0.866 0.373
(0.88)        (0.85)        (0.94)        (1.08)        (1.05)        (1.16)        (1.04)        (1.05)        (0.86)        (1.23)        (1.25)        (1.02)       
Output per capita (logs) 0.125 ** 0.118 ** 0.119 ** 0.143 ** 0.175 ** 0.148 ** 0.057 ** 0.056 ** 0.058 ** 0.110 ** 0.170 ** 0.163 **
(0.06)        (0.06)        (0.05)        (0.07)        (0.07)        (0.06)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)       
Output per capita squared -0.008 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** -0.009 ** -0.010 ** -0.009 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.008 ** -0.011 ** -0.010 **
(0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)       
Economic Growth -0.958 * -0.911 * -1.016 * -0.766 * -0.771 * -0.779 * -1.692 ** -1.694 ** -1.741 ** -0.911 ** -0.804 ** -1.482 **
(0.62)        (0.60)        (0.62)        (0.47)        (0.48)        (0.48)        (0.79)        (0.83)        (0.71)        (0.45)        (0.39)        (0.71)       
Secondary Schooling -0.020 * -0.020 * -0.021 * -0.028 * -0.034 * -0.027 * -0.016 * -0.020 * -0.019 * -0.018 -0.035 -0.047
(0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)       
Liquid Liabilities -0.015 -0.023 -0.019 -0.007 -0.013 -0.010 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 0.033 0.001 0.010
(0.03)        (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.04)        (0.05)        (0.04)       
Inflation Rate 0.079 ** 0.076 ** 0.080 ** 0.069 * 0.072 * 0.085 ** 0.055 * 0.064 * 0.078 * 0.049 * 0.058 * 0.088 **
(0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.04)       
Modern Sector 0.294 * 0.274 * 0.295 * 0.285 * 0.279 * 0.289 * 0.265 * 0.299 * 0.262 * 0.261 0.312 * 0.216
(0.16)        (0.15)        (0.16)        (0.16)        (0.16)        (0.16)        (0.17)        (0.19)        (0.17)        (0.18)        (0.19)        (0.17)       
Physicians per 1000 people -6.117 ** -4.222 ** -5.461 ** -6.550 ** -5.486 ** -5.887 ** -6.722 ** -6.569 ** -7.964 ** -7.704 ** -6.712 ** -9.537 **
(2.17)        (1.55)        (2.00)        (2.68)        (2.43)        (2.53)        (1.99)        (1.91)        (2.06)        (2.40)        (2.49)        (2.50)       
Labor Regulation 0.040 -0.123 * 0.026 0.084 -0.215 * 0.047 0.054 ** 0.022 0.043 ** 0.084 ** 0.031 0.058 **
(0.07)        (0.07)        (0.08)        (0.10)        (0.11)        (0.09)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)       
N o .  O b s e r v a t i o n s 6 86 76 85 35 25 35 35 35 33 83 83 8
R**2 0.407 0.417 0.405 0.227 0.241 0.221 0.480 0.452 0.482 0.349 0.264 0.341
Turning Point 8.0 8.6 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.6 7.2 7.8 8.0








IV Cross-Country Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations  1/
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Full Sample Developing Countries Full Sample Developing Countries
[L0] [L1] [L2] [L0] [L1] [L2] [EL0] [IR0] [SS0] [EL0] [IR0] [SS0]
Constant 0.409 -0.039 0.495 0.609 0.062 0.863 0.372 0.402 0.354 1.170 0.890 0.863
(0.87)        (0.86)        (0.92)        (1.08)        (1.05)        (1.18)        (1.08)        (1.08)        (1.06)        (1.26)        (1.22)        (1.25)       
Output per capita (logs) 0.077 ** 0.079 ** 0.059 ** 0.049 * 0.052 * 0.063 * 0.068 ** 0.052 ** 0.060 ** 0.317 ** 0.295 ** 0.304 **
(0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.02)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)       
Output per capita squared -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.004 * -0.003 * -0.004 * -0.018 * -0.017 * -0.018 *
(0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)       
Economic Growth -1.001 ** -1.048 ** -0.966 ** -0.779 ** -0.905 ** -0.719 ** -1.159 ** -1.188 ** -1.096 ** -1.154 ** -1.552 ** -1.060 **
(0.17)        (0.17)        (0.18)        (0.09)        (0.08)        (0.09)        (0.09)        (0.09)        (0.09)        (0.21)        (0.27)        (0.22)       
Secondary Schooling -0.021 * -0.023 * -0.022 * -0.028 * -0.027 * -0.024 * -0.012 * -0.017 * -0.018 * -0.027 * -0.037 * -0.029 *
(0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.02)        (0.02)       
Liquid Liabilities -0.033 -0.035 -0.028 -0.030 -0.018 -0.030 -0.002 -0.013 -0.010 -0.072 -0.103 * -0.052
(0.04)        (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.03)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.06)       
Inflation Rate 0.078 ** 0.074 * 0.079 ** 0.077 ** 0.077 ** 0.078 ** 0.060 0.045 0.058 0.065 * 0.051 0.061
(0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)        (0.04)       
Modern Sector 0.300 * 0.251 * 0.298 * 0.304 * 0.302 * 0.305 * 0.275 * 0.302 * 0.276 * 0.278 * 0.302 * 0.255 *
(0.16)        (0.16)        (0.16)        (0.16)        (0.17)        (0.16)        (0.18)        (0.18)        (0.18)        (0.16)        (0.17)        (0.17)       
Physicians per 1000 people -5.332 ** -4.734 ** -5.768 ** -5.675 ** -4.788 ** -6.428 ** -7.813 ** -7.463 ** -6.840 ** -9.743 ** -9.468 ** -8.566 **
(1.93)        (1.76)        (2.12)        (2.56)        (2.41)        (2.76)        (2.14)        (2.11)        (2.22)        (2.44)        (2.36)        (2.80)       
Labor Regulation -0.008 -0.125 0.128 0.047 -0.055 0.258 0.092 * 0.058 * 0.062 0.151 ** 0.096 ** 0.107
(0.18)        (0.23)        (0.28)        (0.21)        (0.30)        (0.36)        (0.05)        (0.03)        (0.06)        (0.06)        (0.04)        (0.08)       
No. Observations 66 65 66 51 50 51 51 51 51 36 36 36
R**2 0.407 0.409 0.409 0.216 0.210 0.225 0.482 0.479 0.456 0.359 0.342 0.285
Turning Point 9.6 9.4 9.4 9.7 10.8 10.6 8.6 8.3 8.4 8.8 8.5 8.6
1/  Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of: the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, political orientation of the government to the left, British legal origin,
German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy. The set of instruments was chosen from the existing literature, following Botero et al. (2003).
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Cross-Country Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations 1/ 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1) 
Full Sample of Countries Developing Countries
Least Squares 2/ Instrumental Variables 3/ Least Squares 2/ Instrumental Variables 3/
Labor Regulation Indicators Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2
I. Rama and Artecona (2002) Indicators
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.040 (0.07)        0.41 -0.008 (0.18)        0.41 0.084 (0.10)        0.23 0.047 (0.21)        0.22
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.123 (0.07)        * 0.42 -0.125 (0.23)        0.41 -0.215 (0.11)        * 0.24 -0.055 (0.30)        0.21
Minimum Wage 1/ 0.059 (0.05)        0.53 0.265 (0.24)        0.54 0.018 (0.06)        0.38 0.351 (0.28)        0.40
Social Security  -0.071 (0.04)        * 0.42 0.107 (0.16)        0.42 -0.038 (0.07)        0.23 0.176 (0.19)        0.22
Trade Union  -0.077 (0.06)        0.42 -0.421 (0.21)        ** 0.44 -0.144 (0.09)        * 0.25 -0.399 (0.26)        * 0.25
General Govt. Employment -0.083 (0.05)        * 0.44 -0.444 (0.25)        * 0.44 -0.186 (0.08)        ** 0.30 -0.787 (0.38)        ** 0.29
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.026 (0.08)        0.41 0.128 (0.28)        0.41 0.047 (0.09)        0.22 0.258 (0.36)        0.23
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.130 (0.10)        0.51 1.011 (0.33)        ** 0.54 0.118 (0.11)        0.36 1.623 (0.49)        ** 0.42
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.023 (0.08)        0.41 -0.466 (0.36)        0.43 -0.138 (0.09)        * 0.24 -1.372 (0.71)        * 0.28
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.004 (0.02)        0.41 0.031 (0.10)        0.41 0.011 (0.03)        0.22 0.066 (0.13)        0.22
Central Govt. Employment -0.069 (0.09)        0.39 -0.120 (0.22)        0.39 -0.109 (0.10)        0.20 0.078 (0.37)        0.21
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.077 (0.05)        * 0.42 -0.495 (0.23)        ** 0.44 -0.152 (0.08)        * 0.25 -0.582 (0.29)        ** 0.26
L2 relative to L0 -0.013 (0.08)        0.40 0.134 (0.33)        0.41 -0.014 (0.11)        0.22 0.107 (0.41)        0.22
II. Botero et al. (2002) Indicators
(1) Employment Laws 0.054 (0.02)        ** 0.480 0.092 (0.05)        * 0.482 0.084 (0.03)        ** 0.349 0.151 (0.06)        ** 0.359
Alternative Employment Contracts 0.105 (0.06)        * 0.490 0.239 (0.22)        0.473 0.175 (0.08)        ** 0.375 0.479 (0.34)        0.339
Conditions of Employment 0.046 (0.06)        0.480 0.185 (0.13)        0.497 0.062 (0.10)        0.350 0.282 (0.16)        * 0.379
Job Security 0.001 (0.05)        0.492 0.098 (0.12)        0.503 0.022 (0.05)        0.372 0.181 (0.15)        0.386
(2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law 0.022 (0.02)        0.452 0.058 (0.03)        * 0.479 0.031 (0.03)        0.264 0.096 (0.04)        ** 0.342
Collective Bargaining 0.049 (0.04)        0.459 0.152 (0.08)        * 0.491 0.071 (0.05)        0.278 0.234 (0.11)        ** 0.360
Worker Participation in Management -0.021 (0.03)        0.476 -0.173 (0.15)        0.515 -0.012 (0.04)        0.291 0.064 (0.15)        0.293
Collective Disputes 0.098 (0.06)        * 0.469 0.602 (0.25)        ** 0.537 0.075 (0.10)        0.270 0.342 (0.15)        ** 0.382
(3) Social Security Laws 0.043 (0.02)        ** 0.482 0.062 (0.06)        0.456 0.058 (0.03)        ** 0.341 0.107 (0.08)        0.285
Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits 0.052 (0.07)        0.482 0.208 (0.49)        0.481 0.023 (0.10)        0.343 0.639 (0.63)        0.358
Sickness and Health Benefits 0.077 (0.04)        ** 0.498 0.277 (0.17)        * 0.470 0.094 (0.04)        ** 0.368 0.208 (0.12)        * 0.299
Unemployment Benefits -0.005 (0.04)        0.501 -0.103 (0.20)        0.465 0.014 (0.04)        0.363 0.014 (0.21)        0.365
1/ We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to the equations (2) and (3) in the text. Our control variables are: output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary 
schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians (per 1000 people), and the labor regulation indicator.
2/ We report standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980)
3/ Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of: the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, political orientation of the government to the left, British legal origin,
German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy. The set of instruments was chosen from the existing literature, following Botero et al. (2003).
Full regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, although they are available from the authors upon request.
Finally, * (**) indicates that the indicator of labor regulation is significant at the 10 (5) percent level.  
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Table 8.1.
Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations
The Impact of Regulations in Paper ("De Jure" Regulations)
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Full Sample of Countries Sample of Developing Countries
Least Squares Instrumental Variables Least Squares Instrumental Variables
Variable Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country)
Constant -0.459 … … -0.611 * ... … -0.583 … … -1.214 ** … …
(0.32)          (0.33)          (0.40)          (0.47)         
Output per capita 0.180 ** 0.181 ** 0.068 0.221 ** 0.214 ** 0.112 0.200 ** 0.255 ** 0.138 0.372 ** 0.455 ** 0.232
  (in logs) (0.08)          (0.09)            (0.12)            (0.08)          (0.09)            (0.14)            (0.10)          (0.11)            (0.15)            (0.12)          (0.14)            (0.19)           
Output per capita -0.011 ** -0.010 ** -0.004 -0.014 ** -0.013 ** -0.007 -0.012 * -0.014 ** -0.008 -0.024 ** -0.028 ** -0.014
  squared (0.00)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.00)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)           
Economic Growth -0.229 -0.164 0.135 -0.338 ** -0.282 * 0.116 -0.143 -0.060 0.172 -0.247 -0.158 0.143
(0.16)          (0.15)            (0.10)            (0.17)          (0.16)            (0.11)            (0.17)          (0.17)            (0.13)            (0.17)          (0.18)            (0.14)           
Secondary Schooling -0.021 ** -0.027 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.025 ** -0.020 ** -0.027 ** -0.039 ** -0.031 ** -0.025 ** -0.039 ** -0.033 **
(0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)            (0.01)          (0.01)            (0.01)           
Liquid Liabilities -0.040 ** -0.050 ** 0.026 -0.048 ** -0.056 ** 0.025 -0.047 ** -0.048 ** 0.026 -0.067 ** -0.074 ** 0.026
(0.02)          (0.02)            (0.02)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.02)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.03)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.03)           
Physicians -3.773 ** -4.521 ** 1.260 * -3.117 ** -3.785 ** 0.741 -5.565 ** -6.157 ** 2.331 * -4.359 ** -4.832 ** 1.145
  (per 1,000 people) (0.84)          (0.90)            (0.76)            (0.82)          (0.85)            (0.72)            (1.02)          (1.12)            (1.29)            (1.04)          (1.07)            (1.23)           
Inflation 0.022 0.026 * -0.011 0.018 0.022 -0.010 0.022 0.034 * -0.013 0.022 0.033 * -0.011
(0.02)          (0.02)            (0.01)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.01)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.01)            (0.02)          (0.02)            (0.01)           
Size of the Modern 0.294 ** 0.257 ** -0.088 0.303 ** 0.268 ** -0.090 0.294 ** 0.263 ** -0.075 0.316 ** 0.278 ** -0.065
  Sector (0.06)          (0.07)            (0.08)            (0.06)          (0.07)            (0.08)            (0.06)          (0.07)            (0.09)            (0.06)          (0.07)            (0.10)           
Labor Rigidity 0.022 0.024 -0.110 * 0.033 0.015 -0.030 0.067 * 0.055 -0.154 * 0.102 0.055 0.007
  Indicator (0.03)          (0.03)            (0.06)            (0.07)          (0.07)            (0.15)            (0.04)          (0.04)            (0.09)            (0.09)          (0.08)            (0.19)           
No. Observations 327 327 327 312 312 312 263 263 263 248 248 248
R**2 0.378 0.410 0.908 0.396 0.425 0.906 0.267 0.303 0.892 0.296 0.332 0.889
Adjusted R**2 0.361 0.383 0.847 0.378 0.398 0.840 0.241 0.263 0.787 0.269 0.292 0.769
GDP Turning Point 7.97 8.68 8.08 7.78 8.40 8.23 8.52 8.87 8.46 7.84 8.20 8.25
Note: Numbers in parenthesis below the coefficients are standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). For the set of instruments see footnote 3 in Table 7.
* (**) indicates that the explanatory variable is statistically significant at the 10 (5) percent level.  
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Table 8.2.
Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations
The Impact of Regulations in Practice Using the L1 Aggregate Index of "De Facto" Regulations
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Full Sample of Countries Sample of Developing Countries
Least Squares Instrumental Variables Least Squares Instrumental Variables
Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country)
Constant -0.560 * …… -0.825 ** ... … -0.819 ** …… -1.411 ** ……
(0.31)        (0.32)       (0.38)        (0.44)     
Output per capita 0.217 ** 0.213 ** 0.049 0.277 ** 0.262 ** 0.161 0.279 ** 0.311 ** 0.071 0.423 ** 0.474 ** 0.252
  (in logs) (0.08)        (0.08)          (0.11)                (0.08)       (0.09)            (0.12)                (0.09)        (0.11)           (0.15)                (0.11)      (0.14)            (0.17)              
Output per capita -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.003 -0.017 ** -0.015 ** -0.008 -0.016 ** -0.017 ** -0.004 -0.026 ** -0.028 ** -0.013
  squared (0.00)        (0.01)          (0.01)                (0.00)       (0.01)            (0.01)                (0.01)        (0.01)           (0.01)                (0.01)      (0.01)            (0.01)              
Economic Growth -0.159 -0.116 0.129 -0.284 * -0.234 * 0.068 -0.072 -0.034 0.170 -0.165 -0.111 0.077
(0.16)        (0.14)          (0.10)                (0.16)       (0.16)            (0.10)                (0.16)        (0.16)           (0.12)                (0.17)      (0.18)            (0.13)              
Secondary Schooling -0.025 ** -0.029 ** -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.030 ** -0.017 ** -0.034 ** -0.043 ** -0.035 ** -0.030 ** -0.042 ** -0.031 **
(0.01)        (0.01)          (0.01)                (0.01)       (0.01)            (0.01)                (0.01)        (0.01)           (0.01)                (0.01)      (0.01)            (0.01)              
Liquid Liabilities -0.058 ** -0.065 ** 0.035 * -0.060 ** -0.069 ** 0.025 -0.064 ** -0.062 ** 0.031 -0.079 ** -0.081 ** 0.026
(0.02)        (0.02)          (0.02)                (0.02)       (0.02)            (0.02)                (0.02)        (0.02)           (0.03)                (0.02)      (0.02)            (0.03)              
Physicians -1.883 ** -2.590 ** 0.780 -2.503 ** -3.147 ** 0.780 -1.852 ** -2.582 ** 1.473 -3.765 ** -4.253 ** 1.297
  (per 1,000 people) (0.55)        (0.80)          (0.66)                (0.73)       (0.81)            (0.68)                (0.83)        (1.11)           (1.11)                (0.96)      (1.03)            (1.15)              
Inflation 0.018 0.022 -0.015 0.018 0.022 -0.013 0.019 0.029 * -0.015 0.022 0.033 * -0.012
(0.02)        (0.02)          (0.01)                (0.02)       (0.02)            (0.01)                (0.02)        (0.02)           (0.01)                (0.02)      (0.02)            (0.01)              
Size of the Modern 0.219 ** 0.191 ** -0.156 ** 0.253 ** 0.222 ** -0.174 ** 0.205 ** 0.187 ** -0.144 * 0.253 ** 0.231 ** -0.155 *
  Sector (0.06)        (0.06)          (0.07)                (0.06)       (0.07)            (0.08)                (0.06)        (0.07)           (0.08)                (0.06)      (0.07)            (0.09)              
Labor Regulation -0.174 ** -0.159 ** 0.162 ** -0.103 -0.130 -0.360 ** -0.248 ** -0.231 ** 0.160 * 0.023 -0.028 -0.498 **
  Indicator (0.03)        (0.04)          (0.06)                (0.08)       (0.10)            (0.14)                (0.05)        (0.06)           (0.09)                (0.12)      (0.13)            (0.20)              
No. Observations 341 341 341 326 326 326 269 269 269 254 254 254
R**2 0.409 0.430 0.910 0.395 0.419 0.910 0.299 0.323 0.893 0.280 0.308 0.896
Adjusted R**2 0.393 0.405 0.855 0.378 0.392 0.851 0.275 0.286 0.794 0.253 0.268 0.787
GDP Turning Point 8.54 9.07 8.61 8.36 8.94 9.93 8.85 9.03 9.66 8.21 8.44 9.95
See footnotes in Table 8.1.  
 




Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations
The Impact of Regulations in Practice using the L2 aggregate index of "De Facto" Regulations
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)
Full Sample of Countries Sample of Developing Countries
Least Squares Instrumental Variables Least Squares Instrumental Variables
Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country) Pooled F-E (Time) F-E (Country)
Constant -0.427 …… -0.575 * ... ... -0.589 …… -1.079 ** ……
(0.32)        (0.33)       (0.40)        (0.46)     
Output per capita 0.185 ** 0.182 ** 0.101 0.215 ** 0.210 ** 0.158 0.217 ** 0.261 ** 0.154 0.330 ** 0.403 ** 0.269
  (in logs) (0.08)        (0.09)          (0.12)                (0.09)       (0.09)            (0.13)                (0.10)        (0.12)           (0.15)                (0.12)      (0.15)            (0.18)              
Output per capita -0.012 ** -0.011 ** -0.005 -0.014 ** -0.012 ** -0.010 -0.013 ** -0.015 ** -0.008 -0.020 ** -0.024 ** -0.016
  squared (0.00)        (0.01)          (0.01)                (0.01)       (0.01)            (0.01)                (0.01)        (0.01)           (0.01)                (0.01)      (0.01)            (0.01)              
Economic Growth -0.281 * -0.238 * 0.125 -0.302 * -0.262 * 0.073 -0.203 -0.162 0.172 -0.201 -0.158 0.104
(0.16)        (0.15)          (0.10)                (0.17)       (0.16)            (0.11)                (0.17)        (0.17)           (0.12)                (0.17)      (0.18)            (0.14)              
Secondary Schooling -0.024 ** -0.029 ** -0.022 -0.021 ** -0.027 ** -0.017 ** -0.032 ** -0.043 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** -0.043 ** -0.033 **
(0.01)        (0.01)          (0.01)                (0.01)       (0.01)            (0.01)                (0.01)        (0.01)           (0.01)                (0.01)      (0.01)            (0.01)              
Liquid Liabilities -0.051 ** -0.058 ** 0.025 -0.048 ** -0.055 ** 0.027 -0.064 ** -0.062 ** 0.022 -0.065 ** -0.069 ** 0.022
(0.02)        (0.02)          (0.02)                (0.02)       (0.02)            (0.02)                (0.02)        (0.02)           (0.03)                (0.02)      (0.02)            (0.03)              
Physicians -2.753 ** -3.398 ** 0.806 -3.121 ** -3.664 ** 0.994 -3.963 ** -4.574 ** 1.295 -4.463 ** -4.760 ** 1.521
  (per 1,000 people) (0.72)        (0.80)          (0.70)                (0.85)       (0.86)            (0.73)                (0.97)        (1.01)           (1.16)                (1.06)      (1.08)            (1.26)              
Inflation 0.013 0.018 -0.018 0.016 0.020 -0.016 0.017 0.028 * -0.017 0.021 0.031 * -0.017
(0.02)        (0.02)          (0.01)                (0.02)       (0.02)            (0.01)                (0.02)        (0.02)           (0.01)                (0.02)      (0.02)            (0.01)              
Size of the Modern 0.265 ** 0.230 ** -0.175 0.257 ** 0.224 ** -0.130 * 0.261 ** 0.232 ** -0.168 ** 0.265 ** 0.234 ** -0.122
  Sector (0.06)        (0.06)          (0.07)                (0.07)       (0.07)            (0.08)                (0.06)        (0.07)           (0.08)                (0.07)      (0.07)            (0.10)              
Labor Regulation -0.065 ** -0.061 ** 0.126 0.091 0.059 -0.364 -0.053 -0.054 * 0.159 ** 0.181 0.109 -0.144
  Indicator (0.03)        (0.03)          (0.05)                (0.10)       (0.10)            (0.31)                (0.04)        (0.03)           (0.06)                (0.13)      (0.13)            (0.39)              
No. Observations 344 344 344 330 330 330 272 272 272 258 258 258
R**2 0.385 0.409 0.904 0.394 0.414 0.902 0.258 0.290 0.887 0.286 0.311 0.882
Adjusted R**2 0.368 0.383 0.846 0.377 0.388 0.838 0.233 0.251 0.785 0.260 0.271 0.763
GDP Turning Point 7.98 8.60 9.34 7.90 8.44 8.30 8.53 8.82 9.49 8.15 8.37 8.54
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Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)             
Full Sample of Countries Developing Countries
Least Squares 2/ Instrumental Variables 3/ Least Squares 2/ Instrumental Variables 3/
Labor Regulation Indicators Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2 Coeff. Std. Dev. R**2
I. Pooled Estimator
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.022 (0.03)          0.38 0.033 (0.07)          0.40 0.067 (0.04)          * 0.27 0.102 (0.09)          0.30
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.174 (0.03)          ** 0.41 -0.103 (0.08)          0.39 -0.248 (0.05)          ** 0.30 0.023 (0.12)          0.28
Minimum Wage 1/ -0.014 (0.02)          0.48 0.075 (0.10)          0.49 -0.063 (0.03)          ** 0.36 0.105 (0.12)          0.38
Social Security  -0.038 (0.02)          ** 0.39 0.122 (0.06)          ** 0.39 -0.030 (0.03)          0.29 0.151 (0.08)          ** 0.29
Trade Union  -0.087 (0.03)          ** 0.42 -0.547 (0.14)          ** 0.42 -0.112 (0.04)          ** 0.31 -0.534 (0.17)          ** 0.31
General Govt. Employment -0.049 (0.02)          ** 0.45 -0.368 (0.13)          ** 0.44 -0.076 (0.03)          ** 0.36 -0.681 (0.21)          ** 0.35
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 -0.065 (0.03)          ** 0.38 0.091 (0.10)          0.39 -0.053 (0.04)          0.26 0.181 (0.13)          0.29
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.041 (0.05)          0.44 0.282 (0.16)          * 0.47 0.027 (0.05)          0.31 0.465 (0.21)          ** 0.37
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.090 (0.03)          ** 0.39 -0.841 (0.29)          ** 0.41 -0.121 (0.03)          ** 0.26 -0.645 (0.36)          * 0.30
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.015 (0.01)          * 0.38 0.087 (0.05)          * 0.40 -0.008 (0.01)          0.26 0.051 (0.05)          0.29
Central Govt. Employment -0.024 (0.03)          0.43 -0.297 (0.13)          ** 0.43 -0.014 (0.04)          0.32 -0.352 (0.21)          * 0.33
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.084 (0.02)          ** 0.39 -0.347 (0.11)          ** 0.41 -0.142 (0.03)          ** 0.29 -0.513 (0.14)          ** 0.32
L2 relative to L0 -0.059 (0.03)          * 0.39 0.051 (0.12)          0.40 -0.083 (0.04)          ** 0.28 -0.010 (0.16)          0.29
II. Time-Effects Estimator
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.024 (0.03)          0.41 0.015 (0.07)          0.42 0.055 (0.04)          0.30 0.055 (0.08)          0.33
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.159 (0.04)          ** 0.43 -0.130 (0.10)          0.42 -0.231 (0.06)          ** 0.32 -0.028 (0.13)          0.31
Minimum Wage 1/ -0.017 (0.02)          0.49 0.045 (0.11)          0.51 -0.063 (0.03)          ** 0.37 0.137 (0.27)          0.38
Social Security  -0.043 (0.02)          * 0.41 0.108 (0.06)          * 0.42 -0.037 (0.03)          0.32 0.119 (0.07)          * 0.32
Trade Union  -0.064 (0.03)          ** 0.44 -0.557 (0.15)          ** 0.45 -0.084 (0.04)          ** 0.34 -0.539 (0.18)          ** 0.35
General Govt. Employment -0.032 (0.03)          0.48 -0.443 (0.13)          ** 0.48 -0.055 (0.03)          * 0.40 -0.661 (0.21)          ** 0.39
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 -0.061 (0.03)          ** 0.41 0.059 (0.10)          0.41 -0.054 (0.03)          * 0.29 0.109 (0.13)          0.31
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.023 (0.04)          0.47 0.323 (0.17)          * 0.49 0.011 (0.05)          0.33 0.430 (0.23)          * 0.39
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.089 (0.04)          ** 0.41 -0.880 (0.29)          ** 0.43 -0.126 (0.06)          ** 0.30 -0.761 (0.36)          ** 0.33
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.014 (0.01)          * 0.41 0.106 (0.06)          * 0.42 -0.010 (0.01)          0.29 0.066 (0.11)          0.31
Central Govt. Employment -0.012 (0.03)          0.45 -0.391 (0.15)          ** 0.46 0.002 (0.04)          0.35 -0.400 (0.24)          * 0.35
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.076 (0.03)          ** 0.42 -0.352 (0.11)          ** 0.44 -0.124 (0.04)          ** 0.32 -0.440 (0.15)          ** 0.35
L2 relative to L0 -0.055 0.03           ** 0.42 0.050 (0.12)          0.43 -0.074 (0.03)          ** 0.32 0.028 (0.16)          0.34
II. Country-Effects Estimator
(0) "De Jure" Index  -0.110 (0.06)          * 0.91 -0.154 (0.07)          ** 0.89 -0.030 (0.13)          0.91 0.007 (0.15)          0.89
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 0.162 (0.06)          ** 0.91 0.160 (0.07)          ** 0.89 -0.360 (0.12)          ** 0.91 -0.498 (0.16)          ** 0.90
Minimum Wage 1/ 0.043 (0.03)          0.90 0.054 (0.04)          0.88 -0.269 (0.13)          ** 0.90 -0.434 (0.18)          ** 0.88
Social Security  0.083 (0.04)          ** 0.91 0.100 (0.05)          ** 0.89 -0.357 (0.13)          ** 0.91 -0.417 (0.15)          ** 0.89
Trade Union  0.071 (0.03)          ** 0.91 0.047 (0.04)          0.89 -0.318 (0.09)          ** 0.91 -0.449 (0.12)          ** 0.90
General Govt. Employment -0.032 (0.03)          0.91 -0.031 (0.04)          0.89 -0.462 (0.14)          ** 0.92 -0.738 (0.20)          ** 0.90
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.126 (0.05)          ** 0.90 0.159 (0.05)          ** 0.89 -0.364 (0.27)          0.90 -0.143 (0.31)          0.88
Minimum Wage 2/ -0.075 (0.07)          0.90 -0.087 (0.08)          0.88 0.706 (0.32)          ** 0.91 0.719 (0.39)          * 0.88
Maternity Leave (# days) 0.128 (0.04)          ** 0.91 0.158 (0.05)          ** 0.90 -0.677 (0.26)          ** 0.91 -0.826 (0.31)          ** 0.89
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 0.039 (0.02)          ** 0.90 0.043 (0.02)          ** 0.89 -0.056 (0.07)          0.90 0.336 (0.13)          ** 0.89
Central Govt. Employment -0.003 (0.04)          0.91 0.125 (0.07)          * 0.89 0.125 (0.05)          ** 0.91 -0.895 (0.24)          ** 0.90
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 0.190 (0.04)          ** 0.91 0.198 (0.05)          ** 0.90 -0.489 (0.18)          ** 0.91 -0.576 (0.20)          ** 0.90
L2 relative to L0 0.149 (0.04)          ** 0.91 0.170 (0.04)          ** 0.90 -0.083 (0.17)          0.91 -0.077 (0.20)          0.89
See footnotes in Table 7.  
  45Table 10. GMM-IV Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations 
Panel Data of 121 countries over period 1970-2000 (5-year observations) 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1), Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) 
 
Full Sample Developing Countries
[L0] [L1] [L2] [L0] [L1] [L2]
Constant -0.54792 ** -0.86464 ** -1.11522 ** -0.57990 -1.13006 * -2.13406 **
(0.279)         (0.153)         (0.211)         (0.656)         (0.709)         (0.633)        
Output per capita (logs) 0.21379 ** 0.33337 ** 0.36383 ** 0.19348 0.37726 ** 0.60374 **
(0.072)         (0.039)         (0.054)         (0.172)         (0.185)         (0.162)        
Output per capita squared -0.01342 ** -0.02026 ** -0.02252 ** -0.01185 -0.02207 ** -0.03586 **
(0.004)         (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.010)         (0.011)         (0.010)        
Economic Growth -0.45007 ** -0.51518 ** -0.61235 ** -0.43762 ** -0.48180 ** -0.61839 **
(0.063)         (0.046)         (0.044)         (0.071)         (0.076)         (0.108)        
Secondary Schooling -0.01813 ** -0.00754 ** -0.01933 ** -0.03518 ** -0.05820 ** -0.04012 **
(0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.007)         (0.010)         (0.011)        
Liquid Liabilities -0.01496 ** -0.03890 ** -0.05673 ** -0.04522 ** -0.02379 -0.07726 **
(0.007)         (0.007)         (0.007)         (0.018)         (0.017)         (0.013)        
Physicians per 1000 people -2.86656 ** 0.55577 -0.90757 ** -4.73321 ** 0.45144 -1.10078
(0.384)         (0.538)         (0.383)         (0.846)         (1.248)         (1.196)        
Inflation Rate -0.00213 -0.01125 ** -0.00801 -0.00549 -0.01563 * -0.01457 *
(0.003)         (0.004)         (0.005)         (0.006)         (0.008)         (0.009)        
Modern Sector 0.20053 ** 0.04739 0.25711 ** 0.35136 ** 0.13603 0.23976 **
(0.045)         (0.038)         (0.048)         (0.139)         (0.127)         (0.115)        
Labor Rigidity 0.04569 ** -0.28914 ** -0.22156 ** 0.10311 ** -0.29065 ** -0.20472 **
(0.022)         (0.022)         (0.021)         (0.047)         (0.075)         (0.056)        
No. Countries 65 65 65 52 51 51
No. Observations 182 199 200 146 156 157
R**2 0.419 0.378 0.421 0.340 0.314 0.293
Turning Point  7.96 8.23 8.08 8.16 8.55 8.42
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test 0.846 0.700 0.855 0.849 0.797 0.862
 - 2nd Order Correlation 0.709 0.994 0.913 0.625 0.957 0.912
Note: Numbers in parenthesis below the coefficients are standard errors.
* (**) indicates that the explanatory variable is statistically significant at the 10 (5) percent level.
 
 
  46Table 11.               
GMM-IV Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations, Sensitivity 
Analysis on Panel Regressions for Different Measures of Labor Regulations 
Sample of All Countries, 1970-2000, Panel data of 5-year non-overlapping observations     
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1)                 
 
                                                            
      Gini             Top 20            Top 40            Middle 20             Bottom 40          Bottom 20          
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.   
                                                             
I. Full Sample of Countries                                                           
(0) "De Jure" Index   0.0457      (0.022)  **  0.419   0.0068     (0.097)   0.433 0.0598     (0.042)   0.444 -0.0260     (0.012)  **  0.421  0.0107     (0.025)   0.356  -0.0167     (0.010) *  0.262  182 
(1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.2891      (0.022)  **  0.378   -0.2832     (0.040) ** 0.398 -0.1575     (0.034) ** 0.410 0.0412     (0.018)  **  0.415  0.0995     (0.017) ** 0.307  0.0365     (0.010) ** 0.219  199 
 Minimum  Wage  1/  0.0302      (0.020)    0.492   0.0262     (0.028)   0.466 0.0200     (0.035)   0.488 0.0066     (0.012)    0.436  -0.0317     (0.021)   0.412  -0.0163     (0.009) *  0.318  198 
  Social Security Contribution  -0.0384      (0.020)  *  0.345   -0.0342     (0.026)   0.384 -0.0382     (0.017) ** 0.380 0.0135     (0.005)  **  0.385  0.0343     (0.010) ** 0.290  0.0192     (0.013) *  0.228  171 
  Trade Union Membership  -0.1396      (0.024)  **  0.425   0.0369     (0.028)   0.374 0.0272     (0.031)   0.372 -0.0146     (0.030)    0.413  -0.0339     (0.014) ** 0.250  -0.0214     (0.007) ** 0.159  194 
  General Govt. Employment  -0.0919      (0.017)  **  0.478   -0.0503     (0.026) *  0.434 -0.0969     (0.039) ** 0.431  0.0116     (0.010)    0.459  0.0562     (0.015) ** 0.321  0.0227     (0.025)   0.206  174 
(2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.2216      (0.021)  **  0.421   -0.1700     (0.031) ** 0.415 -0.0705     (0.027) ** 0.415 0.0158     (0.031)    0.413  0.0402     (0.021) *  0.324  0.0185     (0.009) ** 0.207  200 
 Minimum  Wage  2/  -0.0410      (0.084)    0.499   -0.0237     (0.118)   0.523 -0.0335     (0.041)   0.497 -0.0065     (0.031)    0.427  0.0008     (0.050)   0.441  -0.0228     (0.040)   0.331  199 
  Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.0485      (0.022)  **  0.409   -0.1214     (0.042) ** 0.408 -0.0847     (0.035) ** 0.423 0.0250     (0.005)  **  0.428  0.0614     (0.026) ** 0.325  0.0290     (0.011) ** 0.225  175 
  Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.0180      (0.012)  *  0.409   -0.0167     (0.010) *  0.363 0.0032     (0.008)   0.384 0.0014     (0.003)    0.396  0.0008     (0.012)   0.300  -0.0046     (0.002) ** 0.195  200 
  Central Govt. Employment  -0.0478      (0.085)    0.450   -0.0626     (0.047)   0.449 -0.0068     (0.032)   0.449 0.0046     (0.014)    0.449  0.0128     (0.017)   0.338  -0.0076     (0.020)   0.237  174 
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                       
  L1 relative to L0  -0.1750      (0.024)  **  0.354   -0.1691     (0.033) ** 0.427 -0.1324     (0.033) ** 0.410 0.0738     (0.011)  **  0.397  0.0720     (0.018) ** 0.331  0.0371     (0.009) ** 0.243  180 
  L2 relative to L0  -0.0645      (0.024)  **  0.459   -0.1142     (0.039) ** 0.453 -0.0854     (0.062)   0.456 0.0014     (0.013)    0.459  0.0478     (0.027) *  0.355  0.0184     (0.010) *  0.238  181 
                                                        
II. Sample of Developing Countries                                                    
(0) "De Jure" Index   0.1031      (0.047)  **  0.340   0.1404     (0.096)   0.211  0.1698     (0.050) ** 0.334 -0.0829     (0.022)  **  0.301  -0.0995     (0.035) ** 0.284  -0.0433     (0.016) ** 0.304  146 
(1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.2906      (0.075)  **  0.314   -0.4153     (0.118) ** 0.233 -0.2350     (0.061) ** 0.271  0.1012     (0.040)  **  0.178  0.1520     (0.053) ** 0.242  0.0774     (0.022) ** 0.227  156 
 Minimum  Wage  1/  -0.0709      (0.057)    0.340   -0.0927     (0.063)   0.298 -0.0567     (0.047)   0.362 -0.0618     (0.031)  **  0.204  0.0477     (0.037)   0.375  0.0174     (0.016)   0.352  128 
  Social Security Contribution  -0.0534      (0.032)  *  0.289   -0.0937     (0.047) ** 0.196 -0.0840     (0.047) *  0.263 0.0289     (0.019)    0.210  0.0472     (0.026) *  0.232  0.0220     (0.011) ** 0.236  149 
  Trade Union Membership  -0.0584      (0.040)    0.344   0.1398     (0.063) ** 0.156 0.0965     (0.043) ** 0.214 -0.0368     (0.023)  *  0.181  -0.0880     (0.091)   0.159  -0.0232     (0.018)   0.172  151 
  General Govt. Employment  -0.0628      (0.045)    0.354   -0.0471     (0.071)   0.250 -0.0216     (0.053)   0.331  0.0275     (0.019)    0.337  -0.0164     (0.036)   0.276  -0.0056     (0.011)   0.269  131 
(2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.2047      (0.056)  **  0.293   -0.0635     (0.054)   0.184 -0.0286     (0.038)   0.287 0.0398     (0.013)  **  0.242  0.0174     (0.052)   0.240  0.0051     (0.014)   0.240  157 
 Minimum  Wage  2/  0.0383      (0.193)    0.338   0.2389     (0.215)   0.260 0.1848     (0.152)   0.374 -0.1266     (0.084)  *  0.186  -0.1147     (0.101)   0.365  -0.1033     (0.044) ** 0.370  132 
  Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.1036      (0.031)  **  0.292   -0.1437     (0.044) ** 0.235 -0.1099     (0.035) ** 0.333  0.0351     (0.010)  **  0.263  0.0898     (0.024) ** 0.290  0.0326     (0.014) ** 0.297  147 
  Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.0280      (0.012)  **  0.336   0.0144     (0.017)   0.167 0.0170     (0.012)   0.293 0.0032     (0.008)    0.254  -0.0074     (0.006)   0.246  -0.0073     (0.003) ** 0.244  157 
  Central Govt. Employment  0.0532      (0.093)    0.334   -0.0353     (0.069)   0.167 -0.0403     (0.053)   0.312 0.0044     (0.029)    0.296  0.0234     (0.035)   0.215  -0.0170     (0.028)   0.255  131 
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                       
  L1 relative to L0  -0.3225      (0.049)  **  0.301   -0.2437     (0.062) ** 0.257 -0.2422     (0.036) ** 0.355 0.0594     (0.013)  **  0.321  0.1274     (0.039) ** 0.291  0.0595     (0.015) ** 0.304  144 
  L2 relative to L0  -0.1631      (0.025)  **  0.376   -0.2488     (0.046) ** 0.230  -0.1782     (0.025) ** 0.319  0.0483     (0.012)  **  0.291  0.1005     (0.020) ** 0.256  0.0439     (0.011) ** 0.250  145 
                                                                                                    
                                                      
* (**) indicates that the explanatory variable is statistically significant at the 10 (5) percent level. See footnote in Table 3.                                     
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Table 12.
Labor Regulations and Income Inequality: A Scorecard
Based on Panel Data Estimations with Different Techniques
Full Sample of Countries Developing Countries
Labor Indicator Gini Top20 Mid20 Bot20 Gini Top20 Mid20 Bot20
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.4
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.6 -1.0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.6 0.4
Minimum Wages 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.0
Social Security Contribution -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.6 0.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.4
Trade Union Membership -1.0 -0.8 0.4 0.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.2 0.6
General Govt. Employment -0.8 -1.0 0.4 0.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.4 0.4
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 -0.6 -0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.0
Minimum Wages 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.6 -0.2
Maternity Leave (# days) -1.0 -1.0 0.6 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 0.8
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Central Govt. Employment -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -1.0 -0.6 0.6 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.8
L2 relative to L0 -0.6 0.0 0.4 0.2 -0.6 -0.6 0.6 0.2
Note: Using 5 different estimations, we input the value of -1 (+1) to a negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimate, and 0 to non-significant
coefficients. Here, we report the proportion of significant negative and/or positive coefficients.  
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Figure 1.
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Table A.1. 
Cross-Country Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations  1/ 
Indicators of Labor Market Rigidity from Rama and Artecona (2002) 
Using Income Shares as proxy for our dependent variable 
 
Top 20 Top 40 Middle 20 Bottom 40 Bottom 20
Labor Indicator Coeff. R**2 Coeff. R**2 Coeff. R**2 Coeff. R**2 Coeff. R**2 Nobs.
I. Full Sample of Countries
I.1  Least Squares  2/
(0) "De Jure" Index  0.026 0.47 0.050 0.48 -0.030 0.51 -0.020 0.43 -0.018 0.35 68
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.176 ** 0.50 -0.109 * 0.50 0.030 0.50 0.079 * 0.45 0.026 0.36 67
Minimum Wage 1/ 0.006 0.62 0.029 0.62 -0.001 0.55 -0.028 0.61 -0.022 * 0.57 56
Social Security  -0.065 * 0.50 -0.077 ** 0.50 0.017 0.50 0.060 ** 0.46 0.030 ** 0.40 61
Trade Union  -0.106 0.51 -0.042 0.50 -0.003 0.50 0.044 0.45 0.014 0.36 67
General Govt. Employment -0.035 0.53 -0.002 0.52 0.009 0.51 -0.007 0.47 -0.001 0.36 58
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.008 0.47 0.018 0.48 0.008 0.49 -0.026 0.43 -0.013 0.35 68
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.018 0.59 0.026 0.59 -0.012 0.55 -0.014 0.56 -0.014 0.52 57
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.056 0.48 -0.017 0.48 -0.012 0.49 0.029 0.44 0.008 0.35 67
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 -0.012 0.48 -0.006 0.48 0.008 0.50 -0.002 0.43 0.000 0.35 68
Central Govt. Employment 0.039 0.45 0.020 0.46 0.004 0.50 -0.024 0.41 -0.015 0.34 59
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.094 * 0.50 -0.085 ** 0.50 0.036 ** 0.52 0.049 * 0.45 0.025 * 0.37 67
L2 relative to L0 -0.016 0.47 -0.028 0.48 0.031 0.51 -0.003 0.43 0.005 0.34 68
I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/
(0) "De Jure" Index  -0.131 0.48 -0.010 0.49 -0.009 0.51 0.018 0.44 -0.014 0.36 66
(1) "De Facto" Index 1 -0.292 0.50 -0.037 0.49 -0.031 0.51 0.068 0.44 0.004 0.36 65
Minimum Wage 1/ 0.274 0.61 0.468 * 0.62 -0.243 ** 0.59 -0.225 0.60 -0.173 ** 0.56 60
Social Security  0.043 0.51 0.042 0.48 -0.012 0.50 -0.042 0.44 -0.028 0.37 64
Trade Union  -0.317 * 0.52 -0.281 0.51 0.035 0.51 0.246 * 0.48 0.120 * 0.40 65
General Govt. Employment -0.231 0.54 -0.080 0.50 -0.061 0.52 0.106 0.46 0.052 0.35 57
(2) "De Facto" Index 2 0.038 0.47 0.101 0.49 -0.038 0.51 -0.064 0.44 -0.054 0.36 66
Minimum Wage 2/ 0.991 ** 0.62 0.835 ** 0.65 -0.252 ** 0.62 -0.576 ** 0.62 -0.312 ** 0.60 65
Maternity Leave (# days) -0.607 * 0.51 -0.833 * 0.52 0.153 0.51 0.680 ** 0.49 0.284 * 0.40 66
Ratification of ILO Conv. 87 0.026 0.47 -0.059 0.49 0.043 0.52 0.016 0.44 0.014 0.36 66
Central Govt. Employment -0.102 0.45 0.092 0.47 -0.096 0.51 0.024 0.41 -0.017 0.35 58
(3) De Jure vs. De Facto
L1 relative to L0 -0.405 * 0.50 -0.251 0.50 0.034 0.50 0.217 0.46 0.121 * 0.39 65
L2 relative to L0 0.414 0.49 0.121 0.49 -0.011 0.51 -0.110 0.44 -0.005 0.36 66  
  52Table A.1., continued 
 
    
Gini 
Coefficient                  
Top 
20           
Top 
40           
Middle 
20            
Bottom 
40          Bottom 20
Bottom 
20         
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2     Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2    Nobs.  
                                                              
  (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.215          (0.11) *  0.24   -0.281         (0.17)*  0.36 -0.222         (0.12)*  0.361  0.054         (0.04)   0.32 0.078         (0.04)**  0.34  0.168         (0.08)**  0.370 5 2 
   Minimum  Wage  1/  0.018          (0.06)   0.38   -0.095         (0.08)  0.53 -0.038         (0.06)  0.560 0.007         (0.02)   0.40 0.009         (0.02)  0.63  0.031         (0.04)  0.606 41 
    Social Security   -0.038          (0.07)   0.23   -0.064         (0.06)  0.37 -0.088         (0.06)*  0.358 0.036         (0.02) *  0.33 0.027         (0.02)*  0.33  0.052         (0.04)  0.364 4 9 
    Trade Union   -0.144          (0.09) *  0.25   -0.148         (0.12)  0.366 -0.067         (0.10)  0.358 -0.016         (0.04)   0.324 0.027         (0.03)  0.335 0.083         (0.07)  0.373 5 2 
   General  Govt.  Employment  -0.186          (0.08) ** 0.30   -0.107         (0.12)  0.400 -0.088         (0.11)  0.389 0.039         (0.05)   0.344 0.040         (0.03)  0.336 0.050         (0.07)  0.394 4 3 
  (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.047          (0.09)   0.22   0.037         (0.10)  0.314 0.038         (0.08)  0.316  -0.001         (0.03)   0.304  -0.021         (0.02)  0.284 -0.037         (0.05)  0.314 5 3 
   Minimum  Wage  2/  0.118          (0.11)   0.36   0.002         (0.07)  0.476  -0.001         (0.05)  0.500 -0.004         (0.02)   0.388 0.002         (0.02)  0.549 0.005         (0.04)  0.528 4 2 
    Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.138          (0.09) *  0.24   -0.140         (0.09)*  0.343 -0.069         (0.08)  0.334  -0.021         (0.04)   0.309 0.035         (0.03)  0.309 0.090         (0.05)*  0.352 5 2 
    Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.011          (0.03)   0.22   -0.002         (0.03)  0.312  0.002         (0.02)  0.312 0.006         (0.01)   0.310 -0.005         (0.01)  0.278 -0.008         (0.02)  0.309 5 3 
   Central  Govt.  Employment  -0.109          (0.10)   0.20   0.074         (0.16)  0.289 0.050         (0.12)  0.292 0.006         (0.05)   0.308 -0.025         (0.04)  0.271  -0.057         (0.08)  0.296 4 4 
  (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                 
    L1 relative to L0  -0.152          (0.08) *  0.25   -0.208         (0.13)*  0.377  -0.171         (0.08)**  0.380 0.048         (0.03) *  0.332 0.067         (0.03)**  0.375 0.123         (0.06)**  0.387 5 2 
    L2 relative to L0  -0.014          (0.11)   0.22   -0.022         (0.12)  0.312  -0.012         (0.10)  0.312 0.016         (0.04)   0.308  0.001         (0.03)  0.271  -0.004         (0.06)  0.305 5 3 
  I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                            
  (0) "De Jure" Index   0.047          (0.21)   0.22   -0.106         (0.20)  0.32  0.002         (0.17)  0.32 -0.014         (0.06)   0.32 0.013         (0.12)  0.31  -0.013         (0.05)  0.28 51 
  (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.055          (0.30)   0.21   -0.222         (0.28)  0.34  0.001         (0.22)  0.34 -0.035         (0.09)   0.32 0.034         (0.14)  0.33  -0.002         (0.07)  0.30 5 0 
    Minimum Wage 1/  0.351          (0.28)   0.40   0.668         (0.35)*  0.52  0.702         (0.26)**  0.57 -0.227         (0.08) **  0.50 -0.358         (0.17)**  0.61  -0.180         (0.08)**  0.63 3 9 
    Social Security   0.176          (0.19)   0.22   -0.102         (0.16)  0.37 0.082         (0.16)  0.32 -0.014         (0.05)   0.31  -0.068         (0.11)  0.33 -0.055         (0.05)  0.31  48 
    Trade Union   -0.399          (0.26) *  0.25   -0.473         (0.30)*  0.37 -0.232         (0.25)  0.35  0.041         (0.08)   0.33  0.191         (0.18)  0.36 0.093         (0.08)  0.33 5 0 
   General  Govt.  Employment  -0.787          (0.38) ** 0.29   -0.330         (0.46)  0.37 -0.222         (0.34)  0.36 -0.047         (0.11)   0.35 0.207         (0.25)  0.35  0.152         (0.10)  0.32 4 2 
  (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.258          (0.36)   0.23   0.097         (0.33)  0.31  0.153         (0.27)  0.33 -0.055         (0.10)   0.33 -0.098         (0.18)  0.32  -0.078         (0.09)  0.30 51 
   Minimum  Wage  2/  1.623          (0.49) ** 0.42   1.765         (0.63)**  0.56 1.437         (0.45)**  0.62 -0.520         (0.19) **  0.48 -0.917         (0.31)**  0.65 -0.448         (0.14)**  0.68 4 0 
    Maternity Leave (# days)  -1.372          (0.71) *  0.28   -1.599         (0.65)**  0.40 -0.813         (0.55)  0.37 0.176         (0.20)   0.33 0.637         (0.39)*  0.37 0.296         (0.19)*  0.34 5 0 
    Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.066          (0.13)   0.22   -0.116         (0.23)  0.32  -0.128         (0.17)  0.34 0.070         (0.06)   0.35 0.058         (0.12)  0.32  -0.018         (0.03)  0.29 51 
   Central  Govt.  Employment  0.078          (0.37)   0.21   0.219         (0.38)  0.29 0.267         (0.27)  0.32 -0.154         (0.11)   0.35 -0.114         (0.17)  0.31  -0.073         (0.08)  0.31  43 
  (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                 
    L1 relative to L0  -0.582          (0.29) ** 0.26   -0.408         (0.33)  0.35  -0.271         (0.28)  0.35 0.064         (0.08)   0.33 0.207         (0.21)  0.351  0.127         (0.09)  0.333 5 0 
    L2 relative to L0  0.107          (0.41)   0.22   0.409         (0.38)  0.33 0.144         (0.32)  0.33 -0.010         (0.11)   0.32 -0.134         (0.23)  0.322  -0.036         (0.11)  0.285 51 
                                                                                                       
                                                               
See footnote in Table 7                                                            






  53 
Table A.2. 
Cross-Country Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations   1/ 
Indicators of Labor Market Regulation from Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) 
Using Income Shares as proxy for our dependent variable 
 
                                                               
        Gini Coefficient           Top 20  Top 20        Top 40  Top 40        Middle 20 Middle 20         Bottom 40Bottom 40        Bottom 20Bottom 20        
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.  
                                                              
I. Full Sample of Countries                                                            
  I.1  Least Squares  2/                                                            
 (1)  Employment  Laws  0.054          (0.02)  ** 0.480   0.038         (0.03) 0.565 0.033        (0.02)* 0.542 -0.012        (0.01)* 0.542  -0.021         (0.02) 0.505 -0.012        (0.01)* 0.398 5 3 
    Alternative Employment Contracts  0.105          (0.06)  * 0.490   0.055        (0.05) 0.566 0.054         (0.04) 0.545 -0.024        (0.02) 0.547 -0.030        (0.03) 0.506 -0.015        (0.02) 0.398 5 3 
    Conditions of Employment  0.046          (0.06)    0.480   0.043        (0.06) 0.565 0.032        (0.05) 0.542 -0.006        (0.02) 0.543 -0.026        (0.03) 0.505  -0.011         (0.02) 0.398 5 3 
    Job Security  0.001          (0.05)    0.492   0.011         (0.04) 0.567 0.008        (0.03) 0.546 -0.004        (0.01) 0.544 -0.004        (0.02) 0.509 -0.009         (0.01) 0.398 5 3 
  (2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law  0.022          (0.02)    0.452   0.022        (0.02) 0.554 0.026        (0.02)* 0.540 -0.008        (0.01) 0.536 -0.018        (0.01)* 0.505 -0.010        (0.01)* 0.394 5 3 
   Collective  Bargaining  0.049          (0.04)    0.459   0.043        (0.03) 0.559 0.033        (0.03) 0.540 -0.008        (0.01) 0.536 -0.025        (0.02) 0.507  -0.011         (0.01) 0.395 5 3 
    Worker Participation in Management  -0.021          (0.03)    0.476   -0.021         (0.03) 0.579 0.010        (0.02) 0.545 -0.009        (0.01) 0.536 -0.002        (0.02) 0.518 -0.003        (0.01) 0.404 5 3 
   Collective  Disputes  0.098          (0.06)  * 0.469   0.116         (0.07)* 0.580 0.062        (0.05) 0.545 -0.009        (0.02) 0.536 -0.053        (0.04) 0.518 -0.030        (0.02)* 0.414 5 3 
  (3) Social Security Laws  0.043          (0.02)  ** 0.482   0.023        (0.02) 0.558 0.027        (0.02)* 0.546 -0.005        (0.01) 0.529 -0.022        (0.01)** 0.524 -0.012        (0.01)** 0.424 5 3 
    Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits  0.052          (0.07)    0.482   -0.131         (0.06)** 0.591  -0.037        (0.06) 0.555 0.020         (0.03) 0.537 0.018        (0.04) 0.533 -0.017        (0.02) 0.424 5 3 
    Sickness and Health Benefits  0.077          (0.04)  ** 0.498   0.067        (0.03)** 0.585 0.047        (0.03)* 0.555 -0.013        (0.01) 0.537 -0.034         (0.02)* 0.532 -0.017        (0.01)* 0.429 5 3 
   Unemployment  Benefits  -0.005          (0.04)    0.501   0.003        (0.04) 0.562 0.017        (0.03) 0.548  -0.001         (0.01) 0.530 -0.016        (0.02) 0.526 -0.005        (0.01) 0.431  53 
  I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                            
 (1)  Employment  Laws  0.092          (0.05)  * 0.482   0.038        (0.04)  0.551  0.041         (0.04) 0.546 -0.012        (0.01) 0.548 -0.030        (0.03) 0.507  -0.021         (0.01)* 0.407 51 
    Alternative Employment Contracts  0.239          (0.22)    0.473   0.151         (0.19) 0.553 0.219        (0.15) 0.555 -0.068        (0.06) 0.554  -0.151         (0.10)* 0.517 -0.087        (0.05)* 0.424 51 
    Conditions of Employment  0.185          (0.13)    0.497   0.196        (0.25) 0.554 0.049        (0.09) 0.552 0.020        (0.08) 0.549 -0.047        (0.07) 0.510 -0.036        (0.03) 0.412 51 
   Job  Security  0.098          (0.12)    0.503   -0.016        (0.10) 0.579 0.017        (0.08) 0.556 0.092        (0.07) 0.559 0.279        (0.14)* 0.544 0.134        (0.07)* 0.450 51 
  (2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law  0.058          (0.03)  * 0.479   0.023        (0.03) 0.550 0.017        (0.02) 0.539 -0.004        (0.01) 0.544 -0.013        (0.02) 0.500 -0.010        (0.01) 0.392 51 
   Collective  Bargaining  0.152          (0.08)  * 0.491   0.309        (0.18)* 0.595 0.104        (0.14) 0.545 -0.003        (0.05) 0.544  -0.101         (0.10) 0.516  -0.021         (0.02) 0.403 51 
    Worker Participation in Management  -0.173          (0.15)    0.515   -0.276        (0.13)** 0.614 -0.119        (0.11) 0.559 0.018        (0.04) 0.547  0.101         (0.07) 0.535 0.040        (0.04) 0.423 51 
   Collective  Disputes  0.602          (0.25)  ** 0.537   0.573        (0.23)** 0.612 0.359        (0.18)** 0.577 -0.089        (0.07) 0.558 -0.270        (0.13)** 0.551  -0.143         (0.06)** 0.454 51 
  (3) Social Security Laws  0.062          (0.06)    0.456   -0.009        (0.06) 0.545 0.009        (0.05) 0.535 -0.002        (0.02) 0.542 -0.007        (0.03) 0.494  -0.011         (0.02) 0.381  51 
    Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits  0.208          (0.49)    0.481   -0.277        (0.46) 0.573 0.112        (0.38) 0.535 -0.099        (0.17) 0.547 -0.013        (0.23) 0.494 -0.054        (0.12) 0.382 51 
    Sickness and Health Benefits  0.277          (0.17)  * 0.470   0.071         (0.15) 0.547 0.094        (0.13) 0.538 -0.045        (0.04) 0.548 -0.049        (0.09) 0.496 -0.046        (0.05) 0.387 51 
   Unemployment  Benefits  -0.103          (0.20)    0.465   -0.073         (0.14) 0.566 -0.059        (0.12) 0.563 0.048        (0.06) 0.551  0.034        (0.08) 0.535  0.021         (0.05) 0.387 51 
                                                               
   
 




                                                                                                   
            Gini Coefficient           Top 20  Top 20         Top 40  Top 40         Middle 20 Middle 20          Bottom 40Bottom 40         Bottom 20Bottom 20           
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2    Nobs.   
   (1) Employment Laws  0.084          (0.03)  ** 0.349    0.046        (0.04)   0.416   0.060        (0.03)**  0.441   -0.024        (0.01)**  0.423   -0.036        (0.02)**  0.438   -0.026        (0.01)**  0.454   38  
      Alternative Employment Contracts  0.175          (0.08)  ** 0.375    0.089        (0.09)   0.422   0.089        (0.07)   0.445   -0.032         (0.03)   0.425   -0.057        (0.05)   0.443   -0.032        (0.02)   0.456   38  
      Conditions of Employment  0.062          (0.10)     0.350    0.037        (0.08)   0.416   0.074         (0.07)   0.442   -0.034        (0.03)   0.426   -0.039        (0.05)   0.439   -0.023        (0.02)   0.454   38  
      Job Security  0.022          (0.05)     0.372    0.015         (0.04)   0.421   0.025        (0.03)   0.450   -0.010        (0.01)   0.433   -0.015        (0.02)   0.446   -0.023        (0.01)**  0.455   38  
   (2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law  0.031          (0.03)     0.264    0.005        (0.03)   0.386   0.023        (0.03)   0.375   -0.007        (0.01)   0.351   -0.017        (0.02)   0.388   -0.012        (0.01)*  0.339   38  
      Collective Bargaining  0.071          (0.05)     0.278    0.024        (0.05)   0.389   0.042        (0.04)   0.381   -0.015        (0.02)   0.356   -0.028        (0.03)   0.392   -0.020        (0.01)   0.348   38  
      Worker Participation in Management  -0.012          (0.04)     0.291    -0.022        (0.04)   0.399   0.005        (0.03)   0.384   0.000         (0.01)   0.358   -0.005        (0.02)   0.395   -0.002        (0.01)   0.364   38  
      Collective Disputes  0.075          (0.10)     0.270    0.057        (0.09)   0.394   0.039         (0.07)   0.377   -0.011         (0.03)   0.351   -0.028        (0.05)   0.390   -0.029        (0.02)   0.351   38  
   (3) Social Security Laws  0.058          (0.03)  ** 0.341    0.033         (0.03)   0.419   0.037        (0.02)*  0.428   -0.011         (0.01)   0.382   -0.026        (0.01)**  0.445   -0.014        (0.01)**  0.395   38  
      Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits  0.023          (0.10)     0.343    -0.173        (0.08)**  0.476   -0.087        (0.07)   0.459   0.028        (0.04)   0.403   0.059        (0.05)   0.479   0.002        (0.03)   0.400   38  
      Sickness and Health Benefits  0.094          (0.04)  ** 0.368    0.072        (0.04)*  0.452   0.057        (0.03)*  0.439   -0.019        (0.01)*  0.394   -0.038         (0.02)*  0.455   -0.020        (0.01)**  0.405   38  
      Unemployment Benefits  0.014          (0.04)     0.363    0.014        (0.04)   0.423   0.032        (0.04)   0.428   -0.008         (0.02)   0.384   -0.024        (0.02)   0.445   -0.009        (0.01)   0.400   38  
   II.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                                                                
   (1) Employment Laws  0.151          (0.06)  ** 0.359    0.060        (0.06)   0.414   0.069        (0.05)   0.426   -0.022        (0.02)   0.394   -0.047        (0.03)   0.434   -0.034        (0.02)**  0.401   36  
      Alternative Employment Contracts  0.479          (0.34)     0.339    0.334        (0.26)   0.430   0.250        (0.23)   0.442   -0.046         (0.10)   0.411   -0.204        (0.15)   0.451   -0.083        (0.07)   0.432   36  
      Conditions of Employment  0.282          (0.16)  *  0.379    0.065        (0.23)   0.423   0.061         (0.18)   0.443   -0.011         (0.06)   0.417   -0.050        (0.13)   0.444   -0.032        (0.06)   0.446   36  
      Job Security  0.181          (0.15)     0.386    -0.774        (0.43)*  0.428   0.028        (0.13)   0.457   0.000        (0.04)   0.437   -0.028        (0.09)   0.453   -0.035        (0.04)   0.432   36  
   (2) Industrial (Collective) Relations Law  0.096          (0.04)  ** 0.342    0.029        (0.04)   0.405   0.036        (0.04)   0.411   -0.012        (0.01)   0.386   -0.024        (0.02)   0.418   -0.020        (0.01)*  0.382   36  
      Collective Bargaining  0.234          (0.11)  ** 0.360    0.254        (0.20)   0.443   0.088        (0.09)   0.415   -0.026        (0.03)   0.385   -0.063        (0.07)   0.425   -0.047        (0.03)*  0.389   36  
      Worker Participation in Management  0.064          (0.15)     0.293    -0.236        (0.16)*  0.471   0.012        (0.10)   0.411   -0.013         (0.04)   0.386   0.048        (0.09)   0.435   -0.019        (0.04)   0.376   36  
      Collective Disputes  0.342          (0.15)  ** 0.382    0.673        (0.31)**  0.499   0.147         (0.14)   0.426   -0.050        (0.05)   0.398   -0.097        (0.10)   0.432   -0.069        (0.04)*  0.397   36  
   (3) Social Security Laws  0.107          (0.08)     0.285    -0.010         (0.08)   0.398   0.035        (0.07)   0.398   -0.014        (0.03)   0.378   -0.022        (0.04)   0.403   -0.024        (0.02)   0.349   36  
      Old Age, Disability and Death Benefits  0.639          (0.63)     0.358    0.093        (0.54)   0.398   0.286        (0.42)   0.404   -0.119        (0.17)   0.385   -0.113        (0.28)   0.480   -0.121         (0.13)   0.357   36  
      Sickness and Health Benefits  0.208          (0.12)  *  0.299    0.095        (0.19)   0.401   0.124        (0.16)   0.402   -0.079        (0.05)   0.393   -0.028         (0.07)   0.408   -0.038        (0.03)   0.354   36  
      Unemployment Benefits  0.014          (0.21)     0.365    -0.123        (0.18)   0.455   -0.057        (0.18)   0.405   0.040         (0.07)   0.393   0.017        (0.10)   0.460   -0.011         (0.05)   0.407   36  
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                       
See footnote in Table 7.                                                                                                
 
 
  55Table A.3. 
Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations  1/ 
Sensitivity Analysis on Panel Regressions for Different Measures of Labor Regulations 
Sample of ALL Countries, 1970-2000, Panel data of 5-year non-overlapping observations 




                                                                                                    
            Gini Coefficient            Top 20  Top 20         Top 40  Top 40         Middle 20 Middle 20          Bottom 40Bottom 40         Bottom 20Bottom 20           
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.   
                                                                                                        
I. Pooled Estimators                                                                                                 
   I.1  Least Squares  2/                                                                                                 
   (0) "De Jure" Index   0.022          (0.03)     0.38    -0.019         (0.03)   0.37   0.014         (0.02)   0.39   -0.022         (0.01)*  0.31   0.008         (0.02)   0.33   -0.005         (0.01)   0.29   327  
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.174          (0.03)  ** 0.41    -0.193         (0.04)**  0.41   -0.134         (0.03)**  0.42   0.057         (0.02)**  0.32   0.077         (0.02)**  0.33   0.028         (0.01)**  0.28   341  
      Minimum Wage 1/  -0.014          (0.02)     0.48    -0.030         (0.02)   0.47  -0.018         (0.02)   0.49  0.014         (0.01)*  0.37  0.004         (0.01)   0.41  -0.001         (0.00)   0.34   286  
      Social Security   -0.038          (0.02)  ** 0.39    -0.040         (0.02)*  0.39  -0.040         (0.01)**  0.40  0.000         (0.01)   0.30  0.039         (0.01)**  0.34  0.016         (0.00)**  0.30   312  
      Trade Union   -0.087          (0.03)  ** 0.42    -0.075         (0.03)**  0.42  -0.037         (0.02)*  0.43  0.003         (0.01)   0.33  0.034         (0.02)**  0.34  0.013         (0.01)*  0.28   334  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.049          (0.02)  ** 0.45    -0.077         (0.02)**  0.43   -0.039         (0.02)**  0.44   0.030         (0.01)**  0.37   0.009         (0.01)   0.36   0.001         (0.01)   0.30   295  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.065          (0.03)  ** 0.38    -0.083         (0.04)**  0.38   -0.038         (0.03)   0.39   0.020         (0.01)*  0.31   0.018         (0.02)   0.31   -0.003         (0.01)   0.26   344  
      Minimum Wage 2/  0.041          (0.05)     0.44    0.056         (0.04)   0.44  0.032         (0.03)   0.45  0.002         (0.02)   0.34  -0.034         (0.02)*  0.38  -0.015         (0.01)   0.33   292  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.090          (0.03)  ** 0.39    -0.115         (0.02)**  0.38  -0.084         (0.02)**  0.39  0.014         (0.01)   0.30  0.070         (0.01)**  0.33  0.033         (0.01)**  0.29   331  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.015          (0.01)  *  0.38    -0.021         (0.01)**  0.38   -0.009         (0.01)   0.39   0.004         (0.00)   0.31   0.005         (0.01)   0.32   -0.001         (0.00)   0.27   344  
      Central Govt. Employment  -0.024          (0.03)     0.43    -0.043         (0.04)   0.41   -0.012         (0.03)   0.41   0.002         (0.01)   0.33   0.010         (0.02)   0.32   -0.004         (0.01)   0.26   298  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
      L1 relative to L0  -0.084          (0.02)  ** 0.39    -0.061         (0.03)**  0.38   -0.061         (0.02)**  0.40   0.039         (0.01)**  0.33   0.023         (0.02)   0.32   0.014         (0.01)**  0.29   321  
      L2 relative to L0  -0.059          (0.03)  *  0.39    -0.035         (0.03)   0.37   -0.031         (0.02)   0.39   0.029         (0.01)**  0.32   0.002         (0.02)   0.32   -0.001         (0.01)   0.29   323  
   I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                                                                
   (0) "De Jure" Index   0.033          (0.07)     0.40    -0.067         (0.06)   0.40  -0.017         (0.05)   0.41  0.005         (0.03)   0.308  0.013         (0.03)   0.348  0.001         (0.01)   0.315   312  
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.103          (0.08)     0.39    -0.177         (0.08)**  0.40  -0.078         (0.07)   0.40  0.029         (0.04)   0.304  0.049         (0.04)   0.327  0.022         (0.02)   0.282   326  
      Minimum Wage 1/  0.075          (0.10)     0.49    0.078         (0.10)   0.50  0.094         (0.07)   0.51  -0.025         (0.04)   0.378  -0.068         (0.05)   0.443  -0.024         (0.02)   0.369   273  
      Social Security   0.122          (0.06)  ** 0.39    0.044         (0.06)   0.39  0.055         (0.05)   0.39  -0.037         (0.02)*  0.297  -0.018         (0.03)   0.322  -0.010         (0.01)   0.295   301  
      Trade Union   -0.547          (0.14)  ** 0.42    -0.512         (0.16)**  0.42  -0.386         (0.12)**  0.42  0.195         (0.06)**  0.328  0.192         (0.09)**  0.339  0.081         (0.04)**  0.294   321  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.368          (0.13)  ** 0.44    -0.241         (0.12)*  0.42  -0.131         (0.09)   0.42  0.042         (0.04)   0.347  0.089         (0.06)   0.343  0.043         (0.03)*  0.297   283  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.091          (0.10)     0.39    0.016         (0.10)   0.39  0.020         (0.08)   0.40  0.005         (0.04)   0.311  -0.024         (0.05)   0.324  -0.011         (0.02)   0.279   330  
      Minimum Wage 2/  0.282          (0.16)  *  0.47    0.314         (0.16)*  0.48  0.176         (0.12)   0.48  -0.092         (0.07)   0.359  -0.084         (0.08)   0.408  -0.024         (0.04)   0.355   279  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.841          (0.29)  ** 0.41    -1.075         (0.28)**  0.42  -0.697         (0.23)**  0.42  0.298         (0.11)**  0.321  0.400         (0.16)**  0.339  0.174         (0.07)**  0.295   319  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.087          (0.05)  *  0.40    -0.011         (0.04)   0.40  -0.010         (0.03)   0.41  0.008         (0.01)   0.314  0.003         (0.03)   0.324  -0.004         (0.01)   0.279   330  
      Central Govt. Employment  -0.297          (0.13)  ** 0.43    -0.147         (0.14)   0.43  -0.060         (0.10)   0.42  0.051         (0.05)   0.330  0.009         (0.07)   0.334  0.014         (0.03)   0.273   286  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                            
      L1 relative to L0  -0.347          (0.11)  ** 0.41    -0.120         (0.11)   0.40  -0.134         (0.08)*  0.41  0.060         (0.04)   0.305  0.074         (0.06)   0.344  0.050         (0.03)   0.316   306  
      L2 relative to L0  0.051          (0.12)     0.40    0.190         (0.10)*  0.40  0.080         (0.09)   0.41  -0.026         (0.05)   0.312  -0.054         (0.06)   0.346  -0.019         (0.03)   0.315   309  








                                                                                                   
            Gini Coefficient           Top 20  Top 20         Top 40  Top 40         Middle 20 Middle 20          Bottom 40 Bottom 40         Bottom 20Bottom 20           
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.   
                                                                                                        
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.159          (0.04)  ** 0.43    -0.183         (0.04)**  0.43   -0.128         (0.03)**  0.44   0.056         (0.02)**  0.33   0.072         (0.02)**  0.360   0.026         (0.01)**  0.289   341  
      Minimum Wages  -0.017          (0.02)     0.49    -0.036         (0.02)*  0.49   -0.022         (0.02)   0.51  0.015         (0.01)*  0.38   0.007         (0.01)   0.439   0.000         (0.01)   0.351   286  
      Social Security   -0.043          (0.02)  *  0.41    -0.049         (0.02)**  0.42   -0.044         (0.02)**  0.42  0.001         (0.01)   0.30   0.044         (0.01)**  0.374   0.017         (0.01)**  0.315   312  
      Trade Union   -0.064          (0.03)  ** 0.44    -0.050         (0.03)*  0.45   -0.020         (0.02)   0.46  -0.002         (0.01)   0.35   0.022         (0.02)   0.370   0.010         (0.01)   0.298   334  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.032          (0.03)     0.48    -0.056         (0.03)*  0.47   -0.025         (0.02)   0.47   0.026         (0.01)**  0.39   -0.001         (0.01)   0.391   -0.001         (0.01)   0.314   295  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.061          (0.03)  ** 0.41    -0.081         (0.03)**  0.41   -0.038         (0.02)*  0.41   0.020         (0.01)*  0.32   0.018         (0.02)   0.338   -0.003         (0.01)   0.272   344  
      Minimum Wages  0.023          (0.04)     0.47    0.035         (0.04)   0.48   0.018         (0.03)   0.48  0.006         (0.02)   0.36   -0.024         (0.02)   0.412   -0.013         (0.01)   0.340   292  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.089          (0.04)  ** 0.41    -0.111         (0.04)**  0.42   -0.081         (0.03)**  0.42  0.013         (0.02)   0.31   0.068         (0.02)**  0.360   0.033         (0.01)**  0.307   331  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.014          (0.01)  *  0.41    -0.021         (0.01)**  0.41   -0.009         (0.01)   0.41   0.004         (0.00)   0.32   0.005         (0.01)   0.345   -0.001         (0.00)   0.278   344  
      Central Govt. Employment  -0.012          (0.03)     0.45    -0.026         (0.04)   0.44   -0.001         (0.03)   0.43   0.000         (0.01)   0.34   0.001         (0.02)   0.351   -0.006         (0.01)   0.271   298  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
      L1 relative to L0  -0.076          (0.03)  ** 0.42    -0.051         (0.03)*  0.41   -0.055         (0.02)**  0.43   0.037         (0.01)**  0.34   0.018         (0.01)   0.357   0.013         (0.01)**  0.310   321  
      L2 relative to L0  -0.055           0.03   ** 0.42    -0.029         (0.03)   0.41   -0.027         (0.02)   0.42   0.028         (0.01)**  0.336   0.000         (0.01)   0.360   -0.001         (0.01)   0.306   323  
   I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                                                                
   (0) "De Jure" Index   0.015          (0.07)     0.42    -0.076         (0.07)   0.43  -0.024         (0.05)   0.44  0.006         (0.03)   0.319  0.018         (0.04)   0.379  0.002         (0.02)   0.329   312  
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.130          (0.10)     0.42    -0.198         (0.10)**  0.43  -0.093         (0.07)   0.42  0.033         (0.04)   0.312  0.060         (0.05)   0.355  0.025         (0.02)   0.293   326  
      Minimum Wage 1/  0.045          (0.11)     0.51    -0.083         (0.23)   0.49  0.065         (0.08)   0.53  -0.019         (0.05)   0.384  -0.046         (0.06)   0.465  -0.018         (0.03)   0.377   273  
      Social Security   0.108          (0.06)  *  0.42    -0.037         (0.06)   0.42  0.050         (0.05)   0.41  -0.036         (0.02)   0.304  0.012         (0.03)   0.351  -0.009         (0.02)   0.306   301  
      Trade Union   -0.557          (0.15)  ** 0.45    -0.515         (0.16)**  0.45  -0.389         (0.12)**  0.45  0.196         (0.06)**  0.338  0.193         (0.08)**  0.370  0.083         (0.04)**  0.308   321  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.443          (0.13)  ** 0.48    -0.346         (0.14)**  0.47  -0.207         (0.10)**  0.46  0.069         (0.05)   0.370  0.137         (0.07)*  0.381  0.056         (0.03)*  0.312   283  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.059          (0.10)     0.41    -0.005         (0.11)   0.41  0.006         (0.08)   0.42  0.007         (0.04)   0.318  -0.014         (0.06)   0.350  -0.008         (0.03)   0.290   330  
      Minimum Wages  0.323          (0.17)  *  0.49    0.364         (0.17)**  0.51  0.213         (0.13)*  0.50  -0.103         (0.07)   0.369  -0.110         (0.09)   0.438  -0.030         (0.04)   0.367   279  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.880          (0.29)  ** 0.43    -1.095         (0.30)**  0.44  -0.709         (0.23)**  0.44  0.299         (0.12)**  0.327  0.410         (0.16)**  0.365  0.179         (0.07)**  0.306   319  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.106          (0.06)  *  0.42    0.042         (0.06)   0.42  -0.008         (0.03)   0.43  0.007         (0.02)   0.321  -0.010         (0.03)   0.351  -0.007         (0.02)   0.291   330  
      Central Govt. Employment  -0.391          (0.15)  ** 0.46    -0.264         (0.15)*  0.46  -0.140         (0.12)   0.44  0.075         (0.06)   0.342  0.065         (0.08)   0.364  0.028         (0.04)   0.280   286  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                            
      L1 relative to L0  -0.352          (0.11)  ** 0.44    -0.142         (0.12)   0.43  -0.153         (0.09)*  0.99  0.068         (0.05)   0.318  0.086         (0.06)   0.377  0.054         (0.03)*  0.331   306  
      L2 relative to L0  0.050          (0.12)     0.43    0.177         (0.13)   0.43  0.070         (0.09)   0.44  -0.022         (0.05)   0.325  -0.047         (0.07)   0.379  -0.018         (0.03)   0.330   309  
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                       
See footnotes in Table 7.                                                                                                
                                                                                                       
 
  57Table A.4., Panel Data Regression Analysis between Income Inequality and Labor Market Regulations  1/ 
Sensitivity Analysis on Panel Regressions for Different Measures of Labor Regulations 
Sample of DEVELOPING Countries, 1970-2000, Panel data of 5-year non-overlapping observations 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-1) 
 
 
                                                                                                     
          Gini Coefficient            Top 20  Top 20         Top 40  Top 40         Middle 20 Middle 20          Bottom 40Bottom 40         Bottom 20Bottom 20           
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.   
                                                                                                      
I. Pooled Estimators                                                                                                 
 I.1  Least Squares  2/                                                                                                 
 (0) "De Jure" Index   0.067          (0.04)  *  0.27    0.050         (0.05)   0.20   0.054         (0.03)*  0.26   -0.028         (0.01)**  0.16   -0.026         (0.02)   0.254   -0.018         (0.01)*  0.287   263  
 (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.248          (0.05)  ** 0.30    -0.333         (0.06)**  0.26   -0.218         (0.04)**  0.30   0.082         (0.02)**  0.18   0.136         (0.03)**  0.277   0.047         (0.02)**  0.272   269  
    Minimum Wage 1/  -0.063          (0.03)  ** 0.36    -0.109         (0.03)**  0.35   -0.064         (0.02)**  0.42  0.026         (0.01)**  0.26   0.038         (0.01)**  0.414   0.009         (0.01)   0.382   214  
    Social Security   -0.030          (0.03)     0.29    -0.051         (0.03)*  0.24   -0.048         (0.02)**  0.29  0.010         (0.01)   0.16   0.039         (0.02)**  0.268   0.015         (0.01)**  0.283   256  
    Trade Union   -0.112          (0.04)  ** 0.31    -0.090         (0.05)*  0.28   -0.033         (0.04)   0.32  -0.022         (0.02)   0.24   0.055         (0.03)**  0.285   0.021         (0.01)*  0.282   262  
    General Govt. Employment  -0.076          (0.03)  ** 0.36    -0.130         (0.03)**  0.29   -0.078         (0.02)**  0.34   0.042         (0.01)**  0.24   0.037         (0.02)*  0.322   0.011         (0.01)   0.326   223  
 (2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.053          (0.04)     0.26    -0.058         (0.04)   0.18   -0.021         (0.03)   0.24   0.015         (0.01)   0.15   0.006         (0.02)   0.224   -0.007         (0.01)   0.246   272  
    Minimum Wage 2/  0.027          (0.05)     0.31    0.046         (0.05)   0.26   0.025         (0.04)   0.35  0.004         (0.02)   0.21   -0.029         (0.02)   0.344   -0.014         (0.01)   0.361   220  
    Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.121          (0.03)  ** 0.26    -0.149         (0.03)**  0.20   -0.113         (0.03)**  0.26  0.025         (0.02)*  0.15   0.088         (0.02)**  0.256   0.041         (0.01)**  0.284   260  
    Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.008          (0.01)     0.26    -0.010         (0.01)   0.19   0.000         (0.01)   0.25   0.001         (0.00)   0.16   -0.001         (0.01)   0.237   -0.004         (0.00)   0.259   272  
    Central Govt. Employment  -0.014          (0.04)     0.32    -0.034         (0.05)   0.20   -0.008         (0.04)   0.27   0.004         (0.02)   0.19   0.004         (0.03)   0.236   -0.005         (0.01)   0.262   226  
 (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
    L1 relative to L0  -0.142          (0.03)  ** 0.29    -0.156         (0.04)**  0.24   -0.117         (0.03)**  0.30   0.049         (0.01)**  0.19   0.069         (0.02)**  0.281   0.032         (0.01)**  0.307   257  
    L2 relative to L0  -0.083          (0.04)  ** 0.28    -0.070         (0.04)*  0.20   -0.044         (0.03)*  0.26   0.028         (0.01)**  0.174   0.017         (0.02)   0.250   0.002         (0.01)   0.276   259  
 I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                                                                
 (0) "De Jure" Index   0.102          (0.09)     0.30    -0.016         (0.08)   0.21   0.044         (0.06)   0.27   -0.023         (0.03)   0.15   -0.021         (0.04)   0.27   -0.015         (0.02)   0.31   248  
 (1) "De Facto" Index 1  0.023          (0.12)     0.28    -0.154         (0.13)   0.20   -0.015         (0.10)   0.25   -0.018         (0.05)   0.14   0.033         (0.06)   0.25   0.010         (0.03)   0.27   254  
    Minimum Wage 1/  0.105          (0.12)     0.38    0.260         (0.31)   0.31   0.113         (0.10)   0.45   -0.049         (0.05)   0.27   -0.065         (0.06)   0.46   -0.020         (0.03)   0.45   201  
    Social Security   0.151          (0.08)  ** 0.29    -0.076         (0.07)   0.25   0.097         (0.06)*  0.26   -0.047         (0.03)*  0.14   -0.051         (0.04)   0.25   -0.027         (0.02)   0.28   245  
    Trade Union   -0.534          (0.17)  ** 0.31    -0.664         (0.19)**  0.24   -0.491         (0.14)**  0.31   0.221         (0.06)**  0.20   0.270         (0.11)**  0.28   0.109         (0.05)**  0.30   249  
    General Govt. Employment  -0.681          (0.21)  ** 0.35    -0.583         (0.24)**  0.23   -0.437         (0.18)**  0.29   0.105         (0.07)   0.19   0.333         (0.12)**  0.29   0.151         (0.05)**  0.32   211  
 (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.181          (0.13)     0.29    0.080         (0.13)   0.19   0.117         (0.10)   0.26   -0.029         (0.05)   0.15   -0.087         (0.07)   0.25   -0.044         (0.03)   0.28   258  
    Minimum Wage 2/  0.465          (0.21)  ** 0.37    0.446         (0.22)**  0.33   0.343         (0.16)**  0.43   -0.170         (0.07)**  0.27   -0.172         (0.11)*  0.41   -0.059         (0.05)   0.44   207  
    Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.645          (0.36)  *  0.30    -1.050         (0.36)**  0.22   -0.643         (0.29)**  0.28   0.248         (0.14)*  0.17   0.395         (0.19)**  0.26   0.179         (0.09)**  0.30   248  
    Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.051          (0.05)     0.29    -0.005         (0.05)   0.21   0.017         (0.04)   0.28   0.038         (0.03)   0.15   -0.018         (0.02)   0.27   -0.010         (0.01)   0.29   258  
    Central Govt. Employment  -0.352          (0.21)  *  0.33    -0.256         (0.24)   0.21   -0.113         (0.18)   0.28   0.038         (0.08)   0.18   0.076         (0.12)   0.25   0.020         (0.06)   0.29   214  
 (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
    L1 relative to L0  -0.513          (0.14)  ** 0.32    -0.309         (0.15)**  0.22   -0.333         (0.11)**  0.29   0.128         (0.04)**  0.16   0.206         (0.08)**  0.29   0.105         (0.04)**  0.33   242  
    L2 relative to L0  -0.010          (0.16)     0.29    0.105         (0.14)   0.21   0.007         (0.12)   0.27   0.005         (0.05)   0.16   -0.012         (0.08)   0.27   -0.008         (0.04)   0.31   245  
                                                                                                      
 
 
  58Table A.4, continued 
  
 
                                                                                                   
            Gini Coefficient           Top 20  Top 20         Top 40  Top 40         Middle 20 Middle 20          Bottom 40 Bottom 40         Bottom 20Bottom 20           
Labor Indicator  Coeff.  Std. Dev.     R**2    Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2     Coeff.  Std. Dev.    R**2    Coeff. Std. Dev.    R**2     Nobs.   
                                                                                                        
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.231          (0.06)  ** 0.32    -0.324         (0.07)**  0.28   -0.209         (0.05)**  0.32   0.080         (0.02)**  0.19   0.129         (0.03)**  0.304   0.044         (0.02)**  0.292   269  
      Minimum Wage 1/  -0.063          (0.03)  ** 0.37    -0.113         (0.03)**  0.37   -0.064         (0.02)**  0.44  0.024         (0.01)**  0.27   0.040         (0.02)**  0.444   0.009         (0.01)   0.404   214  
      Social Security   -0.037          (0.03)     0.32    -0.057         (0.03)*  0.26   -0.053         (0.02)**  0.31  0.010         (0.01)   0.16   0.043         (0.02)**  0.304   0.017         (0.01)**  0.310   256  
      Trade Union   -0.084          (0.04)  ** 0.34    -0.065         (0.05)   0.31   -0.014         (0.04)   0.35  -0.027         (0.02)   0.25   0.041         (0.03)*  0.315   0.016         (0.01)   0.303   262  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.055          (0.03)  *  0.40    -0.109         (0.04)**  0.32   -0.062         (0.03)**  0.37   0.037         (0.01)**  0.26   0.025         (0.02)   0.353   0.007         (0.01)   0.346   223  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  -0.054          (0.03)  *  0.29    -0.068         (0.04)*  0.21   -0.028         (0.03)   0.27   0.016         (0.01)   0.16   0.012         (0.02)   0.258   -0.006         (0.01)   0.269   272  
      Minimum Wage 2/  0.011          (0.05)     0.33    0.026         (0.05)   0.29   0.015         (0.04)   0.38  0.004         (0.02)   0.22   -0.019         (0.03)   0.375   -0.012         (0.01)   0.383   220  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.126          (0.06)  ** 0.30    -0.149         (0.06)**  0.23   -0.113         (0.04)**  0.29  0.024         (0.02)   0.16   0.088         (0.03)**  0.288   0.041         (0.01)**  0.304   260  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  -0.010          (0.01)     0.29    -0.014         (0.01)   0.21   -0.002         (0.01)   0.28   0.002         (0.00)   0.17   0.001         (0.01)   0.269   -0.003         (0.00)   0.280   272  
      Central Govt. Employment  0.002          (0.04)     0.35    -0.019         (0.05)   0.23   0.003         (0.04)   0.30   0.002         (0.02)   0.20   -0.005         (0.02)   0.278   -0.008         (0.01)   0.290   226  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
      L1 relative to L0  -0.124          (0.04)  ** 0.32    -0.142         (0.04)**  0.26   -0.107         (0.03)**  0.32   0.049         (0.01)**  0.19   0.059         (0.02)**  0.304   0.029         (0.01)   0.323   257  
      L2 relative to L0  -0.074          (0.03)  ** 0.32    -0.064         (0.04)*  0.23   -0.039         (0.03)*  0.30   0.027         (0.01)**  0.18   0.013         (0.02)   0.287   0.001         (0.01)   0.301   259  
   I.2  Instrumental Variables  3/                                                                                                
   (0) "De Jure" Index   0.055          (0.08)     0.33    -0.036         (0.09)   0.24   0.029         (0.07)   0.30   -0.021         (0.03)   0.17   -0.008         (0.05)   0.30   -0.011         (0.02)   0.33   248  
   (1) "De Facto" Index 1  -0.028          (0.13)     0.31    -0.176         (0.14)   0.22   -0.031         (0.10)   0.28   -0.015         (0.05)   0.15   0.047         (0.07)   0.27   0.015         (0.03)   0.29   254  
      Minimum Wage 1/  0.137          (0.27)     0.38    0.205         (0.31)   0.33   0.080         (0.11)   0.48   -0.045         (0.06)   0.29   -0.035         (0.07)   0.48   0.028         (0.07)   0.45   201  
      Social Security   0.119          (0.07)  *  0.32    -0.085         (0.08)   0.27   0.087         (0.06)   0.28   -0.046         (0.03)   0.15   -0.041         (0.04)   0.28   -0.023         (0.02)   0.30   245  
      Trade Union   -0.539          (0.18)  ** 0.35    -0.668         (0.20)**  0.27   -0.495         (0.14)**  0.33   0.225         (0.07)**  0.21   0.270         (0.10)**  0.31   0.110         (0.05)**  0.32   249  
      General Govt. Employment  -0.661          (0.21)  ** 0.39    -0.602         (0.24)**  0.27   -0.455         (0.18)**  0.34   0.110         (0.08)   0.22   0.345         (0.12)**  0.32   0.156         (0.06)**  0.34   211  
   (2) "De Facto" Index 2  0.109          (0.13)     0.31    0.039         (0.14)   0.21   0.089         (0.10)   0.28   -0.026         (0.05)   0.16   -0.063         (0.07)   0.27   -0.036         (0.03)   0.30   258  
      Minimum Wage 2/  0.430          (0.23)  *  0.39    0.416         (0.24)*  0.36   0.325         (0.17)*  0.46   -0.169         (0.09)*  0.28   -0.157         (0.12)   0.44   -0.055         (0.06)   0.46   207  
      Maternity Leave (# days)  -0.761          (0.36)  ** 0.33    -1.117         (0.39)**  0.24   -0.688         (0.29)**  0.30   0.256         (0.14)*  0.17   0.432         (0.20)**  0.29   0.193         (0.09)**  0.32   248  
      Ratification of ILO Conv. 87  0.066          (0.11)     0.31    -0.019         (0.05)   0.23   0.008         (0.04)   0.30   0.039         (0.04)   0.16   -0.024         (0.06)   0.27   -0.019         (0.03)   0.29   258  
      Central Govt. Employment  -0.400          (0.24)  *  0.35    -0.287         (0.26)   0.23   -0.140         (0.19)   0.30   0.042         (0.09)   0.20   0.099         (0.13)   0.28   0.028         (0.06)   0.30   214  
   (3) De Jure vs. De Facto                                                                                                
      L1 relative to L0  -0.440          (0.15)  ** 0.35    -0.272         (0.17)*  0.24   -0.308         (0.12)**  0.32   0.123         (0.06)**  0.17   0.185         (0.08)**  0.313   0.098         (0.04)**  0.344   242  
      L2 relative to L0  0.028          (0.16)     0.34    0.110         (0.17)   0.24   0.012         (0.13)   0.30   0.004         (0.06)   0.17   -0.017         (0.09)   0.304   -0.011         (0.04)   0.331   245  
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                       
See footnotes in Table 7.                                                                                                
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